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Prior Consistent Statements: Rule
801 (d) (1) (B) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, Critique and
Proposal
By MICHAEL H. GRAHAM*
Until the end of the seventeenth century, prior statements of a wit-
ness were admissible as substantive evidence if they were consistent
with the in-court testimony of the witness.1 When courts admitted such
prior consistent statements, they reasoned that the statements provided
corroborative support for the witness' testimony.
2
Subsequently, the rule was narrowed to permit a prior consistent
statement only if the witness were first impeached upon cross-examina-
tion,3 and then only following certain forms of impeachment.4 Prior
consistent statements were thus admitted under developing common-
law doctrines to rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper influ-
ence or motive, but not as substantive evidence. Such statements were
* B.S.E., 1964, University of Pennsylvania; D., 1967, Columbia University. Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Illinois.
1. 4 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1123 (Chadbourn rev. 1972) [hereinafter cited as 4
WIGMORE].
2. Id.
3. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 49, at 103 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
McCoRMICK]; 3 J. WEiNSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTErN's EVIDENCE 607[8] (1977) [here-
inafter cited as WEINSTEiN]; 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1124; Yoder v. United States, 71
F.2d 85 (10th Cir. 1934); People v. Schmitt, 106 Cal. 48, 39 P. 204 (1895); People v. Foster,
288 M1. 371, 123 N.E. 534 (1919).
4. If the cross-examiner attacked the witness' reputation for veracity, for example, a
prior statement consistent with the witness' testimony was inadmissible because it did not
rebut the attack. If the cross-examiner charged that an improper influence or motive in-
duced the witness' testimony, however, evidence of a statement made by the witness before
the influence was exerted or motive arose would be admitted to rebut the inference that the
influence or motive induced the witness' testimony. Similarly, if the cross-examiner charged
that a witness "recently fabricated" the trial testimony, a consistent statement made prior to
the alleged fabrication was admissible to rebut the inference that the witness had invented
his testimony for trial. McCoRMcK, supra note 3, § 49, at 104-06; 4 WIGMORE, supra note
1, § 1125.
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admitted solely for their rehabilitative effect upon the credibility of the
witness challenged in cross-examination.5
In modem litigation the use of prior consistent statements has be-
come exceedingly confused and complex. Courts frequently disagree
with each other and even occasionally with themselves, resulting in
rules that are subject to varying construction and even more diverse
application.
6
Further complicating the picture, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, in contravention of the common law, now defines a
prior consistent statement as not hearsay, thereby permitting introduc-
tion of such statements as substantive evidence. In short, as a result of
the lack of understanding of the considerations relating to use of prior
consistent statements, the following comment is as true today as it was
when made in 1913:
The subject [use of prior consistent statements] is as perplexing
as any in the law of evidence. Of its many difficulties some are in-
herent, but the more numerous are due to the refusal of jurists to
yield to the arguments and accept the doctrines of both their prede-
cessors and contemporaries, alike in their own and other jurisdic-
tions. This has produced an irreconciliable conflict in the decisions.
7
The subject of prior consistent statements is extraordinarily com-
plex. The present difficulty arises because concepts that come into play
in the litigation context and that govern the admissibility of a prior
consistent statement are confused. These concepts will be analyzed in
order to derive a series of touchstones, each representing one or more
concepts best viewed from a single perspective. Taken together, the
touchstones provide a systematic approach to determining the admissi-
bility of prior consistent statements. The analysis is developed in the
context of Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(1)(B) which provides that a
statement is not hearsay if.
[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement, and the statement is. . . (B)
consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or
implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influ-
5. Advisory Committee Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 296 (1973).
6. This disparate judicial treatment extends to almost every aspect of the use of prior
consistent statements. For example, there is disagreement as to what types of impeachment
trigger rebuttal by consistent statement. Even where agreement exists as to proper method,
the factual prerequisites of impeachment necessary to trigger the rebuttal are the subject of
discord. See generally Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 909 (1961); Annot., 140 A.L.R. 21 (1942).
"[E]ven today there is much difference of judicial opinion as to the extent to which such
evidence may be considered." 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1123.
7. Annot., 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 858 (1913). See also Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 909 (1961).
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ence or motive .... 8
In the process of developing the touchstones, the corroborative ef-
fect of prior consistent statements and the meaning of terms such as
"recent fabrication," "implied charge," and "rebut" are analyzed. The
meaning of "subject to cross-examination" and the question of substan-
tive versus corroborative use are also explored as part of a specific pro-
posed amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) that would incorporate the
series of touchstones. Proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is designed to assist
courts by delineating the factors that must be considered in determin-
ing the admissibility of a prior consistent statement.
Historical Development
The historical development of the rules surrounding the employ-
ment of a prior consistent statement closely parallels the fashioning of
the rule against hearsay. A common feature of the English jury trial
system near the end of the fifteenth century was the testimony of a
witness as to the existence of facts of which he had personal knowledge.
Those facts might include statements made by another.9 Such hearsay
statements were received as substantive evidence well into the seven-
teenth century, 10 often over the objection of the accused person."
Hearsay admissibility began to be questioned by the common-law
courts around 1675. Not until the middle 1700s could it be said that the
rule prohibiting the use of hearsay had crystallized.12
Through the late 1700s, prior consistent statements remained ad-
missible. Although now hearsay, they could be introduced on direct
examination of the witness in order to corroborate the witness' in-court
testimony.13 Wigmore states that "[t]his practice was based on a loose
instinctive logic, popular enough today, that there is some real corrobo-
rative support in such evidence; and the only objection then thought of
was the hearsay rule."' 4 During the late 1700s and early 1800s, objec-
tions were heard on other than hearsay grounds to the indiscriminate
8. FED. R. EvrD. 801(d)(1)(B).
9. See J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
102, 121, 126 (1898); 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1364 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as 5 WIGMORE].
10. R. v. Thomas, Dyer 99b (1553), cited in 5 WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 1364, at 16
n.25.
11. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 1364, at 17.
12. Id. at 18.
13. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1123, at 254 n.1.
14. Id. § 1123 (footnote omitted).
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use of prior consistent statements. This development led to the princi-
ple generally accepted at common law that the testimony of a witness
may not be corroborated on direct examination with a prior consistent
statement.1 5 The rules began to acquire the now-familiar characteristic
of allowing such statements into evidence only to rebut impeaching evi-
dence directed at the credibility of the witness and then only under
certain circumstances. Moreover, the prior consistent statement, be-
cause it is hearsay, was admitted not for its truth but solely to assist the
jury in evaluating the witness' credibility.
In summary, the admissibility of prior consistent statements un-
derwent three periods of development. Prior to 1675, consistent state-
ments were admissible as substantive evidence presented during a
party's case in chief. With the advent of the hearsay rule, prior consis-
tent statements, although no longer admissible for the truth of their
contents, remained admissible during a party's case in chief, but then
solely to buttress in advance the credibility of the in-court witness. Be-
ginning in the early 1800s, prior consistent statements were no longer
admitted into evidence for any reason during presentation of a party's
case in chief. Such statements became admissible only by way of re-
buttal, to support the credibility of the witness after credibility had
been attacked. Dispute among the courts during the latter period fo-
cused upon the circumstances under which a prior consistent statement
is relevant to rebut an attack upon the credibility of the in-court wit-
ness. With the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975,
a fourth period of development was entered-prior consistent state-
ments are once again admissible as substantive evidence, but only if
relevant to rebut specified attacks upon the credibility of the in-court
witness.
The Corroborative Effect of a Prior Consistent Statement:
Admissibility upon Direct Examination
Appreciation of the corroborative effect of a prior consistent state-
ment is of critical importance to an understanding of the rule barring
prior consistent statements upon direct examination. If the rule against
hearsay is placed aside, a prior statement consistent with a party's in-
court testimony is relevant in directly establishing the truth of the mat-
ter stated only if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
15. Id. §§ 1123-1124. See text accompanying notes 16-24 infra.
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or- less probable than it would be without the evidence."'16
Although the statement may well be relevant, because the prior
testimony is cumulative to a considerable degree, it has been asserted
that the probability as to the truth of the fact asserted is not strength-
ened by introduction of the witness' prior consistent statement.17 The
assertion is subject to challenge. The prior statement was made nearer
the event and accordingly while the event was fresher in the person's
memory. Moreover, the witness had less time in which to be affected
by outside influence, including the litigation process itself. On the
other side of the coin, the prior statement may have been made absent
the presence of an oath, under circumstances less conducive to truthful-
ness. Thus, if the prior statement is compared with the in-court testi-
mony, it tends to be more trustworthy because earlier in time and less
trustworthy for lack of formal circumstances.
Complicating the analysis of the corroborative value of the prior
statement is the fact that it is also relevant to an evaluation of witness
credibility and accordingly to an evaluation of the weight to be given to
the witness' in-court testimony. The concept of corroboration thus pos-
sesses two dimensions.' 8 Not only does corroboration refer to the con-
cept that a prior consistent statement may constitute independent
16. FED. R. EviD. 401. One could argue that, given the in-court testimony of the wit-
ness, mere repetition does not make the existence of a fact more or less probable than with-
out the evidence since the identical evidence has already been introduced. Under this
approach to relevancy, and if one accepts for purpose of discussion the assumption that the
two statements by declarant deserve equal weight or, more accurately, that the prior consis-
tent statement is not more probative in any respect than the in-court declaration even
though earlier in time, the prior statement is irrelevant. However, if we look at the prior
statement without reference to the in-court testimony, the prior statement becomes relevant.
The latter approach is preferable.
17. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1124; State v. Parish, 79 N.C. 546, 548 (1878): "It can
scarcely be satisfactory to any mind to say that if a witness testifies to a statement today
under oath, it strengthens the statement to prove that he said the same thing yesterday when
not under oath. . . . [Tihe idea that the mere repetition of a story gives it any force or
proves its truth, is contrary to common observation and experience that afalsehood may be
repeated as often as the truth." Id. at 612.
18. Corroboration as employed in the common law includes both the introduction of
evidence from two witnesses, each tending to establish the same point, and evidence tending
to induce a belief in the testimony of a single witness. "[C]orroborating evidence will of
course usually be furnished in some shape through another witness, and thus there come to
be two witnesses. But the corroborating evidence might conceivably come without another
witness, for example, through the inspection of the accused's person. ... But the corrobo-
ration is asked merely to confirm the single witness' testimony and to induce the belief of it;
so that when the corroboration has been furnished and the witness is believed, the verdict
ultimately is founded upon the single witness' assertion. Put in another way, the treason rule
requires two witnesses to the same fact; the perjury rule requires only one witness to the fact
January 1979] PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
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evidence directly relevant to establishing a fact of consequence, but the
concept of corroboration also encompasses use of a prior consistent
statement as evidence which tends to buttress the credibility of the in-
court declarant. By buttressing the credibility of the witness, the prior
consistent statement is relevant as it indirectly provides probative evi-
dence as to a fact of consequence.
To illustrate this distinction, assume an in-court witness testifies as
to the identity of a bank robber. Such testimony may be corroborated
by another eyewitness identifying the same individual as the bank rob-
ber, or by circumstantial evidence that places the identified individual
at the scene of the robbery. Each item of evidence is independently
probative as to the question of identity. A prior statement of the in-
court witness at a lineup in which the witness identified the defendant
as the bank robber is probative directly on the question of identifica-
tion. In its other dimension, corroboration looks at the prior consistent
statement from the perspective of its probative effect on the credibility
of the in-court witness, and not as evidence directly tending to establish
the truth of the matter asserted. The prior line-up identification tends
to strengthen the credibility of the witness and thus the probative value
of the witness' in-court identification testimony.
The presence of a prior statement made earlier in time does logi-
cally tend to support the credibility of the witness. However, the pro-
bative value of such cumulative statements as they relate to the
credibility of the witness may be exceedingly slight. The probative
value of the prior consistent statement is reduced even further if, for
example, a series of prior consistent and inconsistent statements have
been made,19 if the consistent statement was made on the eve of trial, or
if such statement was made at any time after a motive to fabricate is
alleged to have risen.
Admissibility of a prior consistent statement upon direct examina-
tion of a witness thus resolves into a balancing of the corroborative
effect of the prior consistent statement in both dimensions against trial
considerations such as danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, undue delay, and needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 20
and merely provides a means of reaching a belief in his testimony." 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2042, at 363-64 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
19. Courts are also concerned that admissibility of prior statements on direct examina-
tion would encourage parties to harass witnesses in the hope of obtaining prior consistent
statements. See MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 49, at 106.
20. See 4 WIGMOPB, supra note 1, § 1124 ("Such evidence would indirectly be cumber-
some to the trial and is ordinarily rejected."); accord, United States v. Navarro-Varela, 541
[Vol. 30
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Because the direct probative value of the prior statement closely
parallels the value of the witness' in-court testimony, and that the cor-
roborative effect upon the credibility of the witness is slight at best, the
common law came to reject prior consistent statements offered upon
direct examination 1 as being too cumbersome for the trial process.
2 2
Exclusion of such statements is also supported by the traditional
approach to the hearsay rule. The first prong of the concept of corrob-
oration requires that in order to be relevant the prior consistent state-
ment must directly establish a fact of consequence. Because the
statement must be accepted for its truth, it is excluded as hearsay.23
Clearly the remaining prong alone, corroroborative effect of the prior
statement upon credibility, fails to overcome trial concerns. While the
common-law hearsay rule also supported exclusion, the present exclu-
sion of prior consistent statements on direct examination is now, pursu-
ant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, clearly a result of balancing. The
Federal Rules of Evidence, in Rule 801(d)(1)(B), permit the substantive
admissibility of a prior consistent statement when offered to rebut.
However, a prior consistent statement may still not be introduced upon
F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977). See also note 19 supra & notes
22, 107, 117, 125 infra.
21. This same result has been reached by some courts by the simple although incorrect
expedient of assuming that the fact of a prior consistent statement not under oath is not
logically supportive, either directly or through its effect upon credibility, of the in-court
testimony of a witness. For example, in Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 439 (1836),
the United States Supreme Court stated that a witness' "testimony under oath is better evi-
dence than his confirmatory declarations not under oath; and the repetition of his assertion
does not carry his credibility further, if as far as his oath." Accord, United States v. Sher-
man, 171 F.2d 619, 622 (2d Cir. 1948). See also note 17 supra.
22. See FED. R. Evm. 403. The introduction of a prior consistent statement on direct
examination of a witness would often lead to cross-examination relating to circumstances
surrounding the alleged making as well as possibly the calling of witnesses to support or
deny the making of the statement. In short, one might have a mini-trial on the issue of
whether the prior consistent statement was made and the circumstances surrounding its
making. The same problem of course may sometimes arise with respect to prior consistent
statements admitted to rebut.
23. Graham, Employing Inconsistent Statements For Impeachment And As Substantive
Evidence: .4 Critical Review and Proposed Amendment of Federal Rules of Evidence
801(d)(1)(A), 613 and 607,75 MICH. L. REv. 1565, 1568-74 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Gra-
ham]. See generally MCCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 251; 4 WINsTEIN, supra note 3,
801(d)(1)[01] (1976); 3 A. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018, at 998 n.3. (Chadbourn rev. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as 3A WIGMORE]; Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 43 (1954); McCormick, The Turncoat Wi1tness: Previous Statements as Sub-
stantive Evidence, 25 TEX. L. REv. 573 (1947); Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application
of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. Rinv. 177 (1948); Reutlinger, Prior Inconsistent State-
ments: Presently Inconsistent Doctrine, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 361 (1974); Silbert, Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 49 TEmP. L. Q. 880 (1976).
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direct examination. As stated in the Advisory Committee Note, "[t]he
judgment is one more of experience than of logic" concerning the rule
against hearsay.24
The Charges
This section analyzes the two credibility charges accepted at com-
mon law and treated in Rule 801 (d)(1)B), improper influence or motive
and recent fabrication. 2
5
Recent Fabrication
While considerable disagreement exists in the common law and
pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) concerning application of the phrase
"recent fabrication," there is general consensus as to its definition. In
People v. Singer,26 the court employed the term "fabricated" as
equivalent to "fabricated to meet the exigencies of the case."'27 The
term "recent" was stated in Singer to have a relative and not an abso-
lute meaning.28 "Recent" trial testimony need not have been created
just prior to the trial. Rather, a "fabrication" is "recent" if the in-court
testimony is expressly or impliedly charged to have been consciously
fabricated at any time after the event. Thus, a charge of "recent
fabrication" has been made whenever, upon cross-examination of a
witness, counsel expressly or impliedly charges that the in-court testi-
24. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) (Advisory Committee Note). See United States v. Weil,
561 F.2d 1109, 1111 (4th Cir. 1977) ("Corroborative testimony consisting of prior consistent
statements is ordinarily inadmissible unless the testimony sought to be bolstered has first
been impeached."). See also discussion of the Orthodox Rule in authorities cited note 23
supra.
25. Weinstein and Berger state that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) limits substantive admissibility
to the two situations "in which all American jurisdictions concur in allowing consistent
statements to be used [following] impeachment," ite., "to rebut charges of recent fabrication
or improper influence or motive." 4 WEINsTEIN, supra note 3, 1 801(d)(l)(B)[01]. Seealso
45 CALIF. L. REv. 202, 203 (1957): "(1) Where an attempt has been made to show that the
witness is testifying under the influence of a motive to falsify, evidence of prior consistent
statements made before the existence of the alleged motive is admitted by all American
jurisdictions. Such evidence serves to rebut the inference that the testimony was induced by
the motive. (2) When the testimony is attacked as a fabrication of recent date or "recent
contrivance," evidence of prior consistent statements is admitted by all American authorities
when relevant to rebut the charge. Such statements must have been made prior to the time
of the alleged fabrication."
26. 300 N.Y. 120, 89 N.E.2d 710 (1949).
27. Id. at 124, 89 N.E.2d at 711. Terms associated with "fabricated" are "falsehood,"
"deceit," and "forgery."
28. Id. at 124, 89 N.E. 2d at 711.
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mony of the witness, regardless of when the testimony was crystallized,
is a result of a conscious falsification occurring at any time after the
event related. The use of "recent" is superfluous. In addition, a charge
of inaccurate memory, confusion, or mistake fails to meet the definition
of a charge of recent fabrication and are therefore separate charges.
The perplexity surrounding application of the term "recent
fabrication" stems in great measure from a failure to pursue two ques-
tions which naturally follow. First, which methods of impeachment
during cross-examination are capable of making a prior consistent
statement relevant to rebut, deny or explain. Second, given each such
manner of impeachment, under what circumstances is a prior statement
offered to rebut the charge sufficiently probative to be admissible?
Turning to the first question, "recent fabrication" can be charged
by impeaching counsel in conjunction with any one of three methods of
impeachment. First, counsel can charge that an improper motive or
influence prompted the witness to fabricate the trial testimony. The
important point here is that improper motive or influence is an under-
lying reason for the fabrication, not really a separate charge. The trier
of fact may infer fabrication when testimony is impeached through evi-
dence of improper motive or influence.29
Second, the charge of "recent fabrication" can also be made by
self-contradiction, which has two aspects: negative evidence, a charge
that the witness failed to relate statements consistent with the trial testi-
mony at a time when it would have been natural for him to do so and
positive evidence, a prior inconsistent statement. It is readily apparent
that the term "recent fabrication" as employed in Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is
not itself a means of impeachment but rather a characterization of the
effect of impeachment by improper motive or influence and in certain
circumstances by self-contradiction.
The fact that "recent fabrication" encompasses multiple methods
of impeachment but is not itself a method of impeachment has con-
fused the standards to be applied. Wigmore wisely avoids the dilemma
by treating each of these methods of impeachment separately without
ever employing the term "recent fabrication."30 Rule 801(d)(1)(B) fur-
ther confuses by separately including, along with reference to recent
fabrication, concepts separately referred to as "improper influence or
motive," one of the three methods of impeachment included within the
29. See text accompanying notes 31-44 infra.
30. 4 WIrMORE, supra note I, §§ 1122-1133.
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definition of a charge of recent fabrication. 31
Improper influence or motive-The concept of partiality
Rule 801(d)(1)(B), in conformity with the common law, recognizes
that when during cross-examination an express or implied charge is
made that the witness' in-court testimony is false as a result of an im-
proper influence or motive, a consistent statement made prior to the
alleged existence of the improper influence or motive is admissible to
rebut the charge.
Unfortunately, neither term, "improper influence" or "motive," as
incorporated into Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is specifically defimed in the Rule
nor clearly defined in the authorities. Under generally accepted defini-
tions of these terms, motive may be said to be an emotional state of an
individual, such as racial prejudice, greed, love, or revenge, that may
have prompted the individual to falsify his testimony.32 An influence,
on the other hand, may be defined as an outside force such as a bribe
33
that induces an individual to testify in a particular manner.
34
If the foregoing definitions are employed, an influence may be
said to produce a motive to falsify. Thus "motive" is the thrust of our
concern; the term "influence" as an independent ground for permitting
rebuttal is superfluous and confusing. An "improper" motive is any
motive that tends to induce the witness to do anything but tell the
whole truth.
Wigmore categorizes the kinds of emotion to which Rule
801(d)(1)(B) refers as "untrustworthy partiality. ' 35 Such partiality has
the following three components:
Bias, in common acceptance, covers all varieties of hostility or
prejudice against the opponent personaly or of favor to the propo-
nent personally.
Interest signifies the specific inclination which is apt to be pro-
31. See notes 32-44 & accompanying text infra.
32. A motive is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. People v. Weiss,
252 App. Div. 463, 468, 300 N.Y.S. 249, 255 (1937); see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1164
(4th ed. 1951); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1475 (3d ed. unabr.
1961).
33. See generally People v. Kynette, 15 Cal. 2d 731, 104 P.2d 794 (1940).
34. An influence is a form of persuasion that induces a person to perform some act that
he would not otherwise perform. Powell v. Bechtel, 340 IM. 330, 338, 172 N.E. 765, 768
(1930). See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1698-99 (4th ed. 1951) (undue influence); WEB-
STER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1160 (3d ed. unabr. 1961).
35. 3A WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 945.
[Vol. 30
PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
duced by the relation between the witness and the cause at issue in
the litigation.
Corruption is here to be understood as the consciousfalse intent
which is inferrible from giving or taking a bribe or from expressions
of a general unscrupulousness for the case in hand.36
In order to complete the definition of partiality this author sug-
gests the inclusion of a fourth category: Coercion, intended to include
any form of mental, emotional, or physical duress or compulsion that
overcomes a witness' duty to tell the truth. The witness' emotional pos-
ture, with which Rule 801(d)(1)(B)'s reference to motive-influence is
correctly concerned, is totally incorporated within Wigmore's concept
of partiality as supplemented. Employment of the phrase "partiality"
in place of "improper influence or motive" would have several advan-
tages. First, the term clearly refers to the state of mind of the individ-
ual and avoids reference to the forces which cause the state of mind.
Second, use of "partiality" permits use of the term "influence" in the
context of prior consistent statements to refer solely to the effect of the
partiality upon the testimony and not to the outside force, if any, from
which this state of mind was derived. Third, the term partiality incor-
porates as supplemented Wigmore's all inclusive division of the wit-
ness' emotional states which may prompt false testimony and which
when charged are properly a subject of rebuttal.
Express or Implied Charges
Partiality of a witness may be evidenced either by the circum-
stances of the witness' situation, or by the conduct of the witness him-
self.37 Cross-examination of the witness concerning the existence of
facts from which the jury might naturally infer partiality in any of its
four senses should constitute an implied charge of falsification. 38 How-
ever, if the attorney, during cross-examination, inquires beyond the
mere existence of either the circumstances of the witness' situation or
the conduct of the witness from which partiality may be inferred, and
thereby in his questioning directly asserts the existence of the partiality
previously left to be inferred by the trier of fact, an express charge of
36. Id.
37. Id. "The kinds of evidence available are two: (a) the circumstances of the witness'
situation, making it 'a priori' probable that he has some partiality of emotion for one party's
cause; (b) the conduct of the witness hinself, indicating the presence of such partiality, the
inference here being from the expression of the feeling to the feeling itself." Id. § 945.
38. An implied charge is a charge of partiality made through insinuation, suggestion,
inference or imputation. See generally Van Gallon v. State, 50 So.2d 882 (Fla. 1951); People
v. Singer, 300 N.Y. 120, 89 N.E.2d 710 (1949).
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falsification has been levied. In either event, pursuant to Rule
801(d)(1)(B), a prior consistent statement is now admissible if relevant
to rebut the implied or express charge.
To illustrate the distinction between an express and an implied
charge of partiality, assume that, on cross-examination of the witness,
counsel inquires, "You are the mother of the defendant, aren't you?"
Counsel has made an implied charge of partiality. Although the ques-
tion is a direct inquiry as to a fact, it does not inquire as to the natural
inference the cross-examiner hopes the trier of fact will draw. Now
assume that counsel continues on cross-examination, "You would do
anything you could to help your son, wouldn't you?" This is an express




Although Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not refer expressly to whether the
consistent statement has to have been made prior to the time that the
alleged partiality arose in order to be admissible,4° the rule does re-
quire the statement to rebut the charge that an improper influence or
motive induced the allegedly false testimony. When partiality is im-
pliedly or expressly charged to have resulted in the witness's falsifica-
tion of testimony at trial, a consistent statement made prior to the
existence of the alleged partiality tends to rebut the suggestion of falsi-
39. Note that should the examiner go a step further and question, "Isn't it true that you
made up this story to protect your son?," the question would probably be objectionable as
argumentative. Heafey states that "a question is argumentative and therefore objectionable
if it: (1) Is asked for the purpose of persuading the trier of fact, rather than to elicit informa-
tion or; (2) Calls for an argument in answer to an argument contained in the question or, (3)
Calls for no new facts, but merely asks the witness to assent to inferences drawn by the
examiner from proved or assumed facts." HEAFEY, CALIFORNIA TRIAL OBJECTIONS § 14.1,
at 67 (1967). In asking the witness whether he has made up his testimony, the cross-exam-
iner is not attempting to elicit information; the real purpose of the question is to persuade
the trier of fact. The question merely asks the witness to assent to the inference that counsel
has drawn from the witness' testimony. Thus, the cross-examiner's question is subject to the
objection that it is argumentative. Of course, in any given case, counsel opposing the cross-
examination may prefer either to object on this ground, or for tactical reasons to have the
witness deny forthrightly the accusation.
40. See text accompanying note 8 supra. The California counterpart of Rule
801(d)(1)(B) does expressly require that the prior consistent statement precede the
fabricating motive or influence. CAL. EvID. CODE 791(b) (West 1967) provides that evi-
dence of a prior consistent statement of a witness is inadmissible unless "(b) An express or
implied charge has been made that his testimony at the hearing is recently fabricated or is
influenced by bias or other improper motive, and the statement was made before the bias,
motive for fabrication, or other improper motive is alleged to have arisen."
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fication 4 l On the other hand, a prior consistent statement that oc-
curred after the fabricating influence or motive arose does not rebut the
charge that partiality prompted the witness' testimony. Such a state-
ment would show only that the witness made a statement consistent
with the testimony at a time when he was under the same pressure to
fabricate such testimony as at trial.42
People v. Singer43 illustrates the application of the principle that a
charge of falsification by reason of partiality (improper motive or influ-
ence as employed in Rule 801(d)(1)(B)) may be rebutted by a consistent
statement made prior to the alleged formation of the witness' partiality.
In Singer, a witness for the prosecution had inculpated the defendant
of manslaughter in connection with an illegal abortion. On cross-ex-
amination, the defense developed that although the witness could have
been charged as an accomplice in the abortion based on his trial testi-
mony, he had not been indicted. Thus, the defense impliedly charged
during cross-examination that the witness had fabricated his testimony
in the hope that he would not be indicted as an accomplice in the
crime. In approving admission into evidence of statements consistent
with the witness' testimony made by the witness the day after the abor-
tion, the court first concluded that the alleged partiality of the witness,
that is, his motive to escape indictment, did not exist at the time of the
41. As Wigmore explained, "A consistent statement, at a timeprior to the existence of a
fact said to indicate bias, interest, or corruption, will effectively explain away the force of the
impeaching evidence; because it is thus made to appear that the statement in the form now
uttered was independent of the discrediting influence." 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1128;
see United States v. McGrath, 558 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064
(1978); Gerner v. Vasby, 75 Wis. 2d 660, 250 N.W.2d 319 (1977). In order for the prior
statement to be admitted, evidence must be introduced as to the circumstances surrounding
its making, including the time the statement was made in relation to the formation of the
alleged partiality, sufficient to support a finding that each of the required conditions has
been fulfilled. See generaly FED. R. EvID. 104(a).
42. Comment, Hearsay Under the Proposed Federal Rules: 4 Discretionary 4pproach,
15 WAYNE L. Rnv. 1079, 1092 (1969); see United States v. Well, 561 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir.
1977); United States v. Zito, 467 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1972); Felice v. Long Island R.R., 426
F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970); Abernathy v. Emporia Mfg. Co., 122
Va. 406, 95 S.E. 418 (1918); Sweazy v. Valley Transport, Inc., 6 Wash. 2d 324, 107 P.2d 567
(1940); McCoRMIcK, supra note 3, § 49, at 105; 3 WEINsTEIN, supra note 3, 607[08].
For a discussion of situations in which subsequent statements may be admissible, see
text accompanying notes 72-75 infra. In United States v. Zito, 467 F.2d 1401 (2d Cir. 1972),
the court cited then proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(B) as a codification of the traditional rule that
in order to be admissible, a prior consistent statement must have been made prior to the time
that the motive to fabricate developed. Accord, United States v. Well, 561 F.2d 1109 (4th
Cir. 1977). No federal decision has since indicated that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) was meant to
change the prior rule.
43. 300 N.Y. 120, 89 N.E.2d 710 (1949).
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statements. 44 The court continued: "[T]he idea of fabrication may be
partially rebutted 'by circumstances shewing that the motive upon
which it is supposed to have been founded, could not have had exist-
ence at the time when the previous relation was made and which there-
fore repel the supposition of the fact related being an afterthought or
fabrication.' -45
Self-contradiction
The other two areas of impeachment that may be employed to
demonstrate recent fabrication, negative evidence and prior inconsis-
tent statement, both of which, unlike partiality, involve self-contradic-
tion, are discussed individually below.
Negative Evidence
If counsel, upon cross-examination of a witness, charges that the
witness on a previous occasion failed to speak of the matter now being
asserted at trial under circumstances in which it would have been natu-
ral for the witness to have done so, the witness is being impeached
through self-contradiction. The cross-examiner is asserting that the si-
lence of the witness is inconsistent with his in-court testimony. Such an
attack upon the witness has been referred to as an attack by negative
evidence.46 That term shall be employed in this Article to distinguish
the charge from self-contradiction by prior inconsistent statement, an
attack by positive evidence.
When a witness is charged with having previously remained silent
at a time when it would have been natural for him to speak, evidence of
a consistent statement may be relevant to repel the impeaching infer-
ence. Wigmore states, "[T]he supposed fact of not speaking formerly,
from which we are to infer a recent contrivance of the story, is disposed
of by denying it to be a fact, inasmuch as the witness did speak and tell
44. It is often difficult to determine the point at which the alleged partiality arose,
particularly where testimony of an accomplice witness and a prior consistent statement are
involved. See generally People v. Bays, 448 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
957 (1972); United States v. DeLa Motte, 434 F.2d 289, 293 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied; 401
U.S. 921 (1971); People v. Coleman, 71 Cal. 2d 1159, 1166, 459 P.2d 248, 252-53, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 920, 924-25 (1969); People v. Sewall, 262 Cal. App. 2d 417,421, 68 Cal. Rptr. 708, 710,
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1070 (1968); People v. Singer, 300 N.Y. 120, 123-24, 89 N.E.2d 710,
711 (1949); Brown v. State, 556 S.W. 2d 418, 419 (Ark. 1977).
45. 300 N.Y. at 125, 89 N.E.2d at 712 (quoting 2 EVANS, POTHIER ON CoNTRAcrs 251-
52 (1826).
46. See People v. Gentry, 270 Cal. App. 2d 462, 473, 76 Cal. Rptr. 336, 343 (1969).
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the same story."47 Wigmore's position, while correct, oversimplifies.
Wigmore's analysis assumes that a prior consistent statement was made
at the time when the witness is alleged to have been silent. Obviously a
denial of silence creates a jury issue, and affects the jury's assessment of
the witness' credibility.
There are other possibilities, however. The prior consistent state-
ment may have occurred not at the time of the charged silence, but at
some other time in close proximity thereto or there may have been ex-
tenuating circumstances. Therefore, the witness may either respond
with an admission of silence, a denial, or may couple the admission or
denial with an explanation as to the accuracy of the cross-examiner's
impeaching attack.
The witness may offer a prior consistent statement to rebut the
inference of contrivance. For example, if the witness denies that an
alleged prior conversation took place, the credibility of the witness' de-
nial is supported by the prior consistent statement. An individual who
spoke consistently with present testimony on one occasion near the in-
stance alleged is less likely to have failed to so speak if the conversation
alleged actually had taken place.
A prior consistent statement also addresses the basic fact when of-
fered to explain an admitted silence on the other occasion. Consider in
this context People v. Gentry.48 Gentry was convicted of inflicting cruel
and inhuman corporal punishment upon a one-and-one-half year old
child. A witness, Turner, admittedly in the house when the alleged
child-beating occurred, testified at trial concerning two incidents which
were highly damaging to Gentry. First, he described a previous inci-
dent in which Gentry had slapped the child. Second, Turner described
a half-awake recollection during the night of a child crying, of footsteps
in the hallway, and of hearing other sounds resembling the slapping of
a child. On cross-examination defense counsel established that Turner
had not mentioned any fact that would inculpate Gentry to the deputy
sheriff who was the first officer to question Turner on the night of the
alleged beating. On redirect examination, Turner explained the reason
he had not disclosed the matters to the deputy sheriff. he had just
awakened in the early morning hours from a drunken sleep and was
still in a groggy and sleepy condition when the deputy sheriff question-
ed him. The prosecutor subsequently offered the testimony of another
47. 4 WIwMoRm, supra note 1, § 1129.
48. 270 Cal. App. 2d 462, 76 CaL Rptr. 336 (1969).
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deputy sheriff and a statement reporter, who both testified that Turner
had made a statement the following morning. The statement was read
in evidence and was consistent with Turner's in-court testimony. The
appellate court held that the prior consistent statement had been prop-
erly admitted. The defense had gone to pains to show, and Turner had
admitted, that he was quite intoxicated and had to be shaken when he
was awakened shortly before being questioned. Turner's statement "at
the earliest opportunity, after he had recovered his senses" was found
to be corroborative.
49
When a witness is impeached with an alleged self-contradiction, a
prior consistent statement may also be corroborative in the sense of
supporting the credibility of the witness. The prior consistent statement
may support the witness' denial of the alleged self-contradiction, or it
may be offered to support the witness' explanation. In either event, the
prior consistent statement is being offered to negate the propriety of the
jury's drawing the cross-examiner's intended inference from the basic
fact (the alleged negative evidence). Whether a prior consistent state-
ment is in fact sufficiently corroborative to overcome trial concerns will
depend in great measure upon the circumstances surrounding the mak-
ing of the statement. Analysis of such circumstances, applicable to
both aspects of self-contradiction, is undertaken in the section dealing
with prior inconsistent statements.
Rebut, Deny, or Explain
To fully appreciate the relationship of prior consistent statements
and self-contradiction, it is first necessary to determine when a prior
consistent statement may be said to rebut, deny, or explain. A prior
consistent statement denies the contradiction when the underlying basis
in the evidence from which the trier of fact may draw the initial infer-
ence of self-contradiction is itself disputed. Thus, consider the situation
presented by Wigmore, where the cross-examiner charges a self-contra-
49. 270 Cal. App. 2d at 474, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 344. When the prior consistent statement
is offered in support of the explanation, the consistent statement may occur either before or
after the failure to speak. The probative value of the prior consistent statement in support of
the explanation varies depending upon the circumstances asserted and the length of time
elapsed. Any consistent statement made subsequent to the alleged failure to speak always
suffers from the risk that it was made simply to counteract the impeaching evidence. See
text accompanying note 92 infra. Thus, time elapsed is an especially critical factor if the
prior statement allegedly occurred subsequent to the failure to speak. At some point a delay
in speaking results in the outweighing of probative value of such a statement by trial con-
cerns. See generally FED. R. EVID. 403 and text accomapnying notes 88-92 infa.
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diction based upon negative evidence while the witness testifies.that a
consistent statement was in fact made. The basic fact from which the
intended inference is to arise, that is, failure to speak when it would be
natural to do so, is being contested. Such statements may take various
forms including an assertion of a consistent statement or a complete
denial of the occurrence of the conversation in question. Prior state-
ments offered to buttress a denial of self-contradiction that are not con-
temporaneous with the alleged self-contradiction are also included in
the concept of denial.
A prior statement that rebuts an alleged self-contradiction does not
attack the presence of a basis for the inference raised by the cross-ex-
aminer. Rather, the existence of the prior statement rebuts by disput-
ing the propriety of drawing from the undisputed factual basis the
inference intended by the impeacher. For example, if the witness were
to admit the self-contradiction and offer no explanation, the cross-ex-
aminer might charge lack of recollection rather than contrivance.50 Ev-
idence of a consistent statement made at a time prior to the self-
contradiction and much nearer the event witnessed would demonstrate
that the witness had seen the event and later recalled it as he now does
at trial after having his memory refreshed. The consistent statement
would rebut the intervening inconsistency by disputing the propriety of
the jury's drawing the suggested inference. Similarly, when impeach-
ment is by evidence of partiality and the prior statement predates the
existence of the facts asserted that give rise to the alleged partiality, the
prior statement rebuts; it does not attack the basic fact, that there is
evidence that indicates partiality, only the propriety of drawing the
inference.51
When the prior statement is offered to buttress an explanation for
an admitted failure to speak such as occurred in Gentry, the prior state-
ment may be said to explain. The prior consistent statement, if related
to and thus supportive of the explanation, buttresses the credibility of
the witness by tending to establish that the alleged self-contradiction,
while admitted, occurred under circumstances indicating a lack of con-
scious or deliberate self-contradiction, for example, failure to read the
statement carefully before signing, statement taken out of context, con-
fused at the time, etc. A prior statement which explains addresses both
the weight to be given any inference arising from the basic fact as well
50. See text accompanying notes 98-102 infra.
51. If the basic fact is denied, ag., I am not the girl friend of the defendant, then the
charge of partiality is denied.
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as the propriety of drawing any inference of self-contradiction at all
from the basic fact.
Prior Inconsistent Statements
Prior inconsistent statements are frequently used by counsel upon
cross-examination to impeach the credibility of a witness.52 Impeach-
ment by a prior inconsistent statement may be used to allege an ex-
press or implied charge of partiality, lack of witness recollection, or
contrivance.
The introduction of prior consistent statements to rebut, deny, or
explain is one of the most complex and perplexing analytical problems
in this area of evidence law. Wigmore states that "[t]he field in which
judicial divergence of views is most vigorous and the opposing reasons
most plausible is that of impeachment by prior inconsistent state-
ments. s53 Cases can be found to support or oppose almost any conten-
tion imaginable. 54 As with each of the other touchstones discussed in
this Article, much, but by no means all, of the confusion may be ac-
counted for by a failure to isolate the variables present in any particu-
lar situation.
Out of this disparity of treatment one generally accepted principle
emerges: absent circumstances that would make the prior statement rel-
evant to rebut, deny, or explain, a prior consistent statement possesses
insufficient, independent corroborative impact to be admitted to but-
tress the credibility of a witness impeached by a prior inconsistent
statement.55 To illustrate a situation when the prior consistent state-
ment will be inadmissible, assume that when impeached with a prior
inconsistent statement 5 6 the witness admits or at least does not deny its
making. Assume further that no additional charge is levied by the
cross-examiner and that no explanation is offered by the witness.
Under such circumstances, the witness has been impeached for unrelia-
bility. The jury is being asked to draw the inference that a witness who
spoke one way at trial and another way before trial is unworthy of
belief. If a prior consistent statement is now offered, the argument
against admissibility of the statement to rehabilitate the impeached wit-
52. See FED. R. EVID. 607, 613. See generally Graham, supra note 23.
53. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1126.
54. See generally Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 909 (1961); Annot., 140 A.L.R. 21 (1942).
55. For a discussion of the relevant additional circumstances, see text accompanying
notes 65-106 infra.




ness begins with the assertion that the self-contradiction retains its
damaging effect; it is not explained away by the presence of a consis-
tent statement.
57
Once uttered, the inconsistent statement continues to discredit
even though the witness may have repeated the testimony given at trial
on numerous occasions. The contention that a prior consistent state-
ment corroborates either directly, as to the truth of the matter asserted,
or indirectly, by rendering the witness' trial testimony more credible, is
rejected. The prior statement has too slight and remote a probative
value. Moreover, introduction of such evidence could lead to a pro-
tracted inquiry as to which statement was made most frequently by the
witness, an excursion which will lead only to confusion of the issues
and a waste of time.58 An additional danger is perceived: when the
prior consistent statement was made subsequent to the impeaching
statement, allowing its introduction "would enable the witness at any
time to control the effect of the former declaration, which he was con-
cious [sic] that he had made, and which he might now have a motive to
qualify or weaken, or destroy."59 Closeness in time between a consis-
tent statement and an inconsistent statement occurring subsequent to it
generally has failed to alter the rule of exclusion, at least when inaccu-
rate memory has not been explicitly charged.60 Finally, the corrobora-
tive value of the prior consistent statement, no matter when the
statement occurred, has been denigrated as lacking the presence of an
oath. In Ellicott v. Pearl,6' the Supreme Court stated:
Where witness proof has been offered against the testimony of a
witness under oath, in order to impeach his veracity, establishing that
he has given a different account at another time, we are of opinion
that, in general, evidence is not admissible, in order to confirm his
testimony, to prove that at other times he has given the same account
as he has under oath; for it is but his mere declaration of the fact; and
that is not evidence. His testimony under oath is better evidence
than his confirmatory declarations not under oath; and the repetition
of his assertions does not carry his credibility further, if so far as his
oath.62
57. Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 76 Mass. (10 Gray) 485, 487-90 (1858); accord, Craig v.
Craig, 5 Rawle 91 (Pa. 1835).
58. See notes 19-22 supra & notes 107, 117, 125 infra.
59. Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 440 (1836). With respect to concern with
counteracting pressure brought to bear on parties to obtain successive statements, see note
106 infra.
60. See text accompanying notes 99-103 infra.
61. 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412 (1836).
62. 35 U.S. at 439.
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In this section of the Article the focus is upon the situation in
which no implied or express charge of lack of recollection, contrivance,
or partiality accompanies the attack on credibility by prior inconsistent
statement.63 That situation is referred to as "naked impeachment."
As previously mentioned, if opposing counsel wishes to introduce
a prior consistent statement to rehabilitate a witness damaged by naked
impeachment (an inconsistency without collateral charges), his ability
to do so will in part depend upon whether the witness, during cross-
examination, denied or admitted the inconsistent statement, or coupled
the admission or denial with an explanation. Additional factors of con-
cern include whether the consistent statement was made prior or subse-
quent to the alleged inconsistent statement, the degree to which the
consistent statement relates to the witness' explanation, if one was
given, and the length of time which elapsed between the statements.
When confronted with an alleged inconsistent statement or with
negative evidence, the witness may either (a) admit having made the
prior statement and offer a consistent statement related to an explana-
tion, (b) deny making the prior statement while offering a related state-
ment, (c) deny making the statement, offering an unrelated consistent
statement, or (d) admit making the statement, offering an unlrelated
consistent statement. Each variation will be given independent
consideration.
Approaching each variation as a distinct situation provides an im-
proved understanding of the foundation for Wigmore's comment that,
where a consistent statement if offered to buttress the testimony of a
witness impeached with an inconsistent statement, plausible reasons
support divergent views.64 More importantly, such analysis promotes
understanding of the factors that determine whether a prior consistent
statement may be introduced following naked impeachment by an in-
consistent statement.
Admit-With Related Consistent Statement
A witness confronted by an alleged prior inconsistent statement
may choose to acknowledge its making. The witness may be in no po-
sition to effectively deny the statement's existence, for example, when
the statement has been tape recorded or occurred at a deposition or
63. The situation in which impeachment by inconsistent statement is accompanied by a
charge of lack of recollection or contrivance is discussed in Part IV of this article. The
relationship of partiality to impeachment by self-contradiction is addressed in Part V.
64. See note 53 supra.
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hearing. Alternatively, the witness may simply wish to acknowledge as
correct what is in fact correct.
In either event, the witness will frequently offer, and, in cases in
which the subject matter of the statement is critical, almost invariably
will offer, an explanation of why the prior statement, although ac-
knowledged as made, is incorrect or misleading.65 Along with the prof-
fered explanation, the witness may offer testimony as to a prior
consistent statement. In many instances the prior statement will also be
related to and thus will support the witness' explanation as a matter of
logical relevancy. Since such a prior consistent statement buttresses
overall credibility of the witness through its ameliorating effect upon
the impeachment, the consistent statement should be admitted as ex-
plaining.6 6 Statements that support the witness' explanation are prop-
erly admitted whether they were made prior or subsequent to the
acknowledged inconsistent statement.67 The prior statement must be
significantly related to, and thus sufficiently supportive of the explana-
tion. The relationship in time of the two statements, both with respect
to sequence and length of time elapsed, may affect the probative value
of the prior statement when it is viewed in light of the totality of the
65. The explanation offered may come about as a result of the assertion that the prior
inconsistent statement was distorted as a result of subtle influence, coercion or deceit on the
part of the person eliciting the statement, often a police officer or an investigator. See Pro-
posed Federal Rules of Evidence. Hearing on H.R 5463 Before the Senate Comm on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 302 (1974) (statement of Herbert Semmel): "The problems of
inaccurate repetition, ambiguity and incompleteness of out-of-court statements may be
found in both written and oral statements, although the problem ismore acute in oral state-
ments. But written statements are also subject to distortion. We are all familiar with the
way a skilled investigator, be he a lawyer, police officer, insurance claim agent or private
detective, can listen to a potential witness and then prepare a statement for signature by the
witness which reflects the interest of the investigator's client or agency. Adverse details are
omitted; subtle changes of emphasis are made. It is regrettable but true that some lawyers
will distort the truth to win a case and that some police officers will do the same to "solve" a
crime, particularly one which has aroused the public interest or caused public controversy.
Or the police officer may be seeking to put away a 'dangerous criminal' who the officer
'knows' is guilty but against whom evidence is lacking." See also Goings v. United States,
377 F.2d 753, 762 n.13 (8th Cir. 1967).
Under other circumstances the witness may assert that the prior statement is misleading
because it was made in "undue haste," California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 160 (1970), or is
incomplete. In the latter circumstance, the entire statement that ought in fairness to be in-
troduced may be shown. See Affronti v. United States, 145 F.2d 3, 7 (8th Cir. 1944); FED.
R. EviD. 106 (imited to a writing or recorded statement). See also FED. R. Civ. PROC.
32(a)(4) (deposition offered in evidence by party).
66. See text accompanying notes 50-52 supra.
67. Statements arising subsequently are inherently more suspect. See text accompany-
ing notes 84-85 infra. See also 4 WIGMoRE, supra note 1, § 1126.
January 1979]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
circumstances. However, unlike the situation in which a prior consis-
tent statement is employed to rebut a charge of partiality, the order of
occurrence of the statements does not destroy the explanatory cogency
of the prior consistent statement as a matter of logical relevancy.
Use of a consistent statement made prior to an acknowledged in-
consistent statement to support the witness' explanation is illustrated by
People v. Bias.68 In Bias the defendant was convicted of sexual perver-
sion. The complainant, Mary Ellen, age 16, married and five months
pregnant, testified at the trial that the defendant James Bias, after forc-
ing his way into her apartment with a knife, ordered her to disrobe and
lie upon her bed. Mary Ellen further testified that Bias "forced her
head down toward his penis and said 'Blow it.' Defendant then had an
emission in her mouth."69 On cross-examination, Mary Ellen was
asked if at the preliminary examination she had said that the defendant
did not say anything while on her bed. Mary Ellen, acknowledging her
prior inconsistent statement, offered the explanation that she "didn't
want to say it before."'70 On redirect the prosecution elicited from her
the information that the day after the affair she had told Officer
Showalter that defendant had said "Blow it." Officer Showalter cor-
roborated Mary Ellen's testimony. On appeal the court held introduc-
tion of the prior consistent statement proper as "in answer to an express
or implied charge that the trial testimony was recently fabricated."
'7 '
The court noted in its discussion that Mary Ellen explained when
she admitted the inconsistent statement that she did not want to relate
what defendant had said to her. The prior consistent statement made
privately to Officer Showalter the day after the incident was related to
and supported Mary Ellen's explanation of an unwillingness to relate
the embarrassing incident in public at the preliminary hearing. The
prior statement thus tended to explain the cross-examiner's charge,
arising from the acknowledged inconsistent statement, that Mary Ellen
spoke out of both sides of her mouth.
A consistent statement that occurs after the inconsistent statement
may also explain a charge of self-contradiction by supporting the wit-
ness' explanation. In Hewitt v. Corey,72 for example, the plaintiff
brought an action against a deputy sheriff for the conversion of a horse.
68. 170 Cal. App. 2d 502, 339 P.2d 204 (1959).
69. Id. at 505, 339 P.2d at 207.
70. Id. at 511, 339 P.2d at 210.
71. Id.
72. 150 Mass. 445, 23 N.E. 223 (1890).
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The sheriff alleged, however, that the horse belonged to the plaintiffs
husband, rather than to the plaintiff. The husband then testified that
he did not own the horse. To impeach the husband, the cross-examiner
charged that the husband had included the horse in an earlier mortgage
of his personal property. On redirect, the husband was permitted to
explain that he was unaware at the time of the execution of the mort-
gage that the horse had been included and that he called the mistake to
the attention of the mortgagee shortly after he discovered it. The mort-
gagee was also permitted to testify to the witness' consistent statement.
According to the court, the mortgagee's testimony concerning the con-
sistent statement of the witness tended to confirm the witness' claim
that he was unaware that he had made the earlier inconsistent state-
ment in the mortgage. Thus, while the consistent statement occurred
after the witness' inconsistent statement in the mortgage, the consistent
statement supported the explanation of the acknowledged inconsistent
statement and tended to repel the cross-examiner's charge that the wit-
ness had fabricated his trial testimony.
73
Similarly, in Hanger v. United States74 a witness, Riley, testified
that he participated in a bank robbery with the defendants: On cross-
examination, Riley was impeached by a prior inconsistent statement he
admitted having made in which he stated that he had perpetrated the
robbery alone. Shortly after the inconsistent statement, however, Riley
had made another statement consistent with his trial testimony. The
witness explained that at the time of the inconsistent statement he
shared a jail cell with the defendant and that he could not safely make
the inculpating consistent statement until he was released from the cell.
In admitting the consistent statement, the Hanger court stated:
73. The Hewitt court stated. "Clearly distinguishable from this is a case where it ap-
pears that the witness has at other times made statements inconsistent with his testimony,
and where it is plain that he must have been false at one time or the other. In such case he is
discredited by reason of his contradictory statements at different times, and it is no restora-
tion of his credit to show that at still other times he has made statements in accordance with
his testimony. In the present case, let it be assumed, by way of making a strong illustration,
that the witness when signing the mortgage was the victim of imposition or fraud, whereby
the horse was inserted therein without his knowledge, he being blind, or illiterate, and that
he made a great outcry as soon as he discovered the fact, and took steps to correct the
mistake, and to punish the perpetrators; certainly this would be fair testimony for the con-
sideration of any tribunal which might might have to pass upon the facts. The testimony of
the mortgagee in the present case does not differ in principle, and its competency is sup-
ported, not only by the authorities cited, but by the decisions of other courts, and by various
textbooks." Id. at 446-47, 23 N.E. at 223.
74. 398 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 119 (1969). See also Copes v.
United States, 345 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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[W]e think that in the situation where a key witness admittedly
changes his story or his recital of important relevant events and ad-
mits that his former statements in regard to the proceedings in ques-
tion were a fabrication, that he should be allowed to not only testify
as to what he now swears is a true recital of the events, but to also
testify as to the reasons for his fabrication and the reasons why he
decided to change his story; and all of the incidents and factors that
shed light upon his credibility, both pro and con, are admitted, sub-
ject to the Court's discretion, and left to the jury for its evaluation
and determination.
75
75. 398 F.2d at 105. The court continued: "Naturally, a person who has made admit-
tedly inconsistent statements stands impeached, but the court and the jury are still charged
with the responsibility of ascertaining which evidence is to be credited and only by a full
exposure of the relevant and pertinent facts in this difficult situation can the jury make an
intelligent and reasonable attempt to ascertain the truth. In the case at bar there is no dis-
pute about Riley's making either the consistent or the inconsistent statements. It is not a
swearing match as to what was said but presents the crucial issue of which statements consti-
tute a correct recital of the events under consideration. In this posture relevant evidence,
particularly evidence which is subject to cross-examination, should in the discretion of the
trial court be submitted to the jury for its evaluation." Id.
Interpreting Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the court in United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1009,
1122 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977), quoted approvingly the foregoing passage
from Hanger in support of its conclusion rejecting the proposition that to be admissible a
prior consistent statement must have been made prior to the impeaching inconsistent state-
ment. Scholle specifically adopted the Wigmore view that the requirement that the consis-
tent statement precede the inconsistent statement "seems an unnecessary refinement." Id.
(quoting 4 WiOMoRE, supra note 1, § 1126). Unfortunately Scholle's direct reference to
Wigmore is misleading. Wigmore's reference to the timing of the prior consistent statement
was made in connection with a discussion of the witness' denial, rather than acknowledg-
ment, of the existence of the prior inconsistent statement. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1126.
Moreover, in Scholle, unlike Hanger, the witness' prior inconsistent statement was not ex-
plicitly explained. Thus, a prior consistent statement introduced in the form of a transcript
of the witness' grand jury testimony was not introduced in conjunction with an explanation
of an admitted inconsistent statement. The situation in Scholle involved a consistent state-
ment offered to rebut a charge of improper influence or motive complicated by the presence
of an admitted inconsistent statement. See text accompanying notes 118-126 infra.
Rule 30(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides an excellent example of
introduction of a subsequent statement to explain a self-contradiction either denied, as is the
usual case, or admitted to have been made. Rule 30(e) provides: "(e) Submission to Witness;
Changes; Signing. When the testimony is fully transcribed the deposition shall be submitted
to the witness for examination and shall be read to or by him, unless such examination and
reading are waived by the witness and by the parties. Any changes in form or substance
which the witness desires to make shall be entered upon the deposition by the officer with a
statement of the reasons given by the witness for making them. The deposition shall then be
signed by the witness, unless the parties by stipulation waive the signing or the witness is ill
or cannot be found or refuses to sign. If the deposition is not signed by the witness within 30
days of its submission to him, the officer shall sign it and state on the record the fact of the
waiver or of the illness or absence of the witness or the fact of the refusal to sign together
with the reason, if any, given therefor and the deposition may then be used as fully as
though signed unless on a motion to suppress under Rule 30(d)(4) the court holds that the
reasons given for the refusal to sign require rejection of the deposition in whole or in part."
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Deny-With Related Consistent Statement
When questioned concerning an alleged prior inconsistent state-
ment, a witness may simply deny having made it. Under such circum-
stances, the witness may offer (usually on redirect) testimony as to the
content of a consistent statement alleged to have been made either at or
near the time inquired of on cross-examination. So long as the exist-
ence of the alleged inconsistent statement is denied, the corroborative
effect of a prior consistent statement differs dramatically from the situ-
ation in which the prior inconsistent statement is admitted to have been
made. When the prior inconsistent statement is admitted, its damaging
nature is in no sense explained away by a consistent statement not re-
lated to an explanation. As Wigmore notes, the inconsistent statement
"is just as discrediting, if it was once uttered, even though the other
story has been consistently told a score of times."76 When the existence
of the inconsistent statement is denied, however, a prior consistent
statement may be of assistance to the jury in determining whether or
not the alleged inconsistency was uttered. Accordingly, Wigmore con-
tinues, "[tlhe jury have still to determine who say that he did in fact
utter it; and if his consistency at other times can assist them in reaching
a conclusion upon this fundamental point, it is relevant."
77
When confronted with an alleged inconsistent statement the wit-
ness may respond that not only did he not make the statement attrib-
uted to him but that at the exact moment in contention the witness
made a statement consistent with his in-court testimony. Proof of such
a prior consistent statement contradicts the extrinsic proof of the incon-
sistent statement offered by the cross-examiner. In addition, such a
consistent statement supports the witness' denial. Because the state-
ment is relevant in determining whether an inconsistent statement was
made, it is admissible as a denial.78
See generaly Rogers v. Roth, 477 F.2d 1154 (10th Cir. 1973); Usiak v. New York Task
Barge Co., 299 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1962); Alien & Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Co., 49 F.R.D.
337 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also FED. R. EvID. 106; FED. R. Crv. PRoc. 32(a)(4).
76. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1126.
77. Id. at 260; accord, Felice v. Long Island R.R., 426 F.2d 192, 197-98 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970); United States v. Corry, 183 F.2d 155, 157 (2d Cir. 1950); Wil-
liams v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 245 S.W.2d 659, 665; McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 49
n.92.
78. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra. See also FED. R. Evm. 613, which pro-
vides: "(a) Examining witness concerning prior statement. In examinating a witness con-
cerning a prior statement made by him, whether written or not, the statement need not be
shown nor its contents disclosed to him at that time, but on request the same shall be shown
or disclosed to opposing counsel. (b) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of
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Alternatively, the witness may assert when confronted with the al-
leged self-contradiction that although he in fact had the conversation
alleged, the inconsistent statement was not uttered. He may also assert
that the conversation referred to did not take place. In addition, the
witness may offer to buttress his denial with a prior consistent state-
ment made in proximity to but not in lieu of the denied inconsistent
statement. Under such circumstances the rationale supporting admissi-
bility differs. The prior consistent statement made in proximity to the
denied inconsistent statement does not dispute directly; it supports the
witness' denial only by giving rise to the inference that it is unlikely
that a witness who has spoken consistently near the time of the alleged
inconsistent statement would make such an inconsistent statement.
79
The corroborative value and, thus, admissibility of such a consistent
statement are dependent upon certain relevant factors including the re-
lationship, if any, between the circumstances surrounding the alleged
assertions, the length of time that has elapsed between them, and fi-
nally, the order of occurrence.
If the circumstances surrounding the making of the prior consis-
tent statement are related to those surrounding the denied inconsistent
statement, the inference that arises may possess substantial corrobora-
tive value.80 To illustrate, assume a witness testifies that immediately
witness. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible
unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite
party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests ofjustice other-
wise require. This provision does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in
rule 801(d)(2)."
79. See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1126. When the witness denies having contra-
dicted himself, the prior consistent statement made in close proximity to the alleged contra-
diction is offered in support of the witness' denial that he did utter the contradiction. Unlike
the situation in which the prior inconsistent statement is admitted but unexplained, the prior
statement is not being offered as being logically relevant solely as evidence corroborative of
the truth of the matter asserted or as corroborative of the credibility of the wintess arising
from the fact that a prior consistent statement was made. The prior consistent statement
additionally supports the denial; it gives rise to the inference that a witness who spoke con-
sistently with the trial testimony would not, and thus did not, make the inconsistent utter-
ance attributed to him.
80. Of course, a denial of inconsistency comprises either a denial of having had the
conversation in question or a denial of having made the inconsistent statement during an
admitted conversation. A prior consistent statement, made in close proximity to the alleged
inconsistent statement and made most often to a third party, will in many instances buttress
the witness' credibility more effectively than when the consistent statement is said to have
occurred at the moment the inconsistent statement is alleged to have occurred. It follows
that an assertion of a consistent statement at the moment charged, coupled with a consistent
statement in close proximity thereto, even more strongly supports the witness' position.
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before leaving the house he tells his wife, "I have to go over to talk with
an insurance investigator. I guess he wants to be sure that the blue car
was speeding," or that upon his return he states in response to his wife's
question, "Where were you?" that "I was over with the insurance inves-
tigator. I told him that the blue car was speeding." Obviously the but-
tressing effect of the earlier statement upon a witness' denial of having
told the insurance investigator that he did not see the blue car at, all is
extremely strong.8' Where, as often happens, the relationship of the
consistent statement to the denied inconsistent statement is more tenu-
ous, the buttressing effect of the prior statement is reduced
accordingly. 2
When the related consistent statement, offered in support of a de-
nial of the inconsistent statement, occurred subsequent to the alleged
inconsistent statement, the concern previously discussed8 3 comes into
play---"it is possible, if not probable, that the inducement to make them
is for the very purpose of counteracting those first uttered."84 While
prior consistent statements are not deemed inadmissible merely by vir-
tue of occurring subsequent to the denied inconsistent statement,85 such
fact is relevant in assessing the corroboiative value of the prior consis-
tent statement. Similarly, length of time between the statements is an
important consideration in determining admissibility.
In United States v. Corry,86 for example, the court approved ad-
mission of a statement consistent with the witness' in-court testimony.
The consistent statement was made two days before the alleged occur-
rence of an inconsistent statement. Contrast Felice v. Long Island
81. See generally State v. Hendricks, 32 Kan. 559, 4 P. 1050 (1884); Stewart v. People,
23 Mich. 63 (1871).
82. See, eg., Felice v. Long Island R.R. Co., 426 F.2d 192, 198 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 820 (1970); United States v. Cony, 183 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1950); Hale v. Smith, 254
Or. 300, 460 P.2d 351 (1969); Twarposky v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 95
N.H. 279, 62 A.2d 723 (1948).
83. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
84. Conrad v. Griffey, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 480, 492 (1850).
85. See, eg., State v. Hendricks, 32 Kan. 559, 562-63, 4 P. 1050, 1051-52 (1884); "It is
well settled by the authorities that if a witness be impeached by proof of his having previ-
ously made statements out of court inconsistent with his testimony in court, he may then be
corroborated by evidence of other statements made by him out of court in harmony with his
testimony, if made immediately after the occurrences of which he has testified took place,
and made before he has had any reason or ground for fabricating an untrue or false state-
ment; and such corroborating evidence is not limited to those statements made by him
before the time when his statements given in evidence to impeach him were made, but may
be extended to other statements made by him afterwards."
86. 183 F.2d 155, 156-57 (2d Cir. 1950).
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R.R. ,87 which involved impeachment by negative evidence denied by
the plaintiff. A consistent statement made two months after the state-
ment that the plaintiff alleges was merely incomplete was held to have
"no sufficient logical tendency to show that statements made within a
week were incomplete. ' 88 The court noted, however, that prior consis-
tent statements made two and nine days prior to the alleged inconsis-
tent statements "could well cast doubt on [their] completeness."8 9 As is
to be expected, in determining admissibility trial courts are afforded a
good deal of latitude in weighing, in light of the totality of the circum-
stances, the corroborative value of the prior consistent statement and
trial concerns. 90 For example, where the consistent statement occurs a
considerable time subsequent to the denied self-contradiction and is re-
motely related at best, such discretion will frequently be exercised, as it
was in Felice, in favor of finding the corroborative value too slight and
remote in comparison with trial concerns that would arise from intro-
duction of the statement.91
Deny-With Unrelated Consistent Statement
When prior consistent statement unrelated to the circumstances
surrounding the denied inconsistency is offered to buttress the witness'
denial, the question of admissibility becomes solely one of weighing the
probative value of the inference created against trial concerns. The in-
ference that it is unlikely the witness uttered the self-contradiction
arises solely from the witness' having made the consistent statement;
87. 426 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970).
88. Id. at 198.
89. Id. Judge Friendly also stated: "The only basis for admitting statements by Felice
concerning the cause of his injury made some time after the event would be as prior state-
ments that would be consistent with his testimony at trial and would tend to overcome the
impeachment that defendant sought to accomplish from the absence of any reference to
slipping in the four reports on which it relied. Judge L. Hand's opinion for this court in
United States v. Sherman, 171 F.2d 619, 621-22 (1948), cert. denied, Grimaldi v. United
States, 337 U.S. 931, 69 S. Ct. 1484, 93 L. Ed. 1738 (1949), is a leading authority against the
use of consistent statements for rehabilitation. However, the apparent logic of the position
that 'since the self-contradiction is conceded, it remains as a damaging fact, and is in no
sense explained away by the consistent statement,' 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1126 at 197 (3d
ed. 1940), is criticized by WIGMORE on the ground, rather pertinent here where the self-
contradiction is an alleged omission which the plaintiff denied, that the consistent statement
might lead the trier to conclude that the self-contradiction had not occurred."
90. Id. at 198 ("[A] good deal of latitude should thus be accorded trial judges in admit-
ting prior consistent statements for rehabilitation . . . ."); accord, United States v. Mc-
Grath, 558 F.2d 1102, 1107 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978).
91. 426 F.2d at 198. For discussion of trial concerns, see notes 19-22 supra, & notes
107, 117, 125 infra.
[Vol. 30
PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
the additional probative force arising from the totality of circumstances
associated with a related consistent statement is obviously absent.
Even though less corroborative than its related brother, the unre-
lated prior statement preceding the alleged self-contradiction is suffi-
ciently supportive of the denial to be admitted.92 The prior consistent
statement still gives rise to the inference that the witness, having spoken
consistently, would not have uttered the denied self-contradiction.
However, where the prior statementfollows the alleged inconsistency
so as to be outside the totality of circumstances surrounding the making
of the alleged inconsistent statement, the propriety of admitting the
consistent statement is less clear.
As with any subsequent consistent statement, opposing admissibil-
ity is the possibility that "the inducement to make them is for the very
purpose of counteracting those first uttered. ' 93 Moreover, almost any
witness at some point prior to trial will make a statement consistent
with his in-court testimony even if not explicitly with the intent to
counteract an inconsistent statement. Finally, the probable value of the
inference itself diminishes as the length of time between the two state-
ments increases and the trial of the action approaches. Accordingly,
the probative value of the subsequent consistent statement that is not
related to the circumstances surrounding the witness' denial, is rela-
tively slight and remote, and should not be admitted.94
Admit-With Unrelated Consistent Statement
The fourth touchstone applicable to a witness' response addresses
the situation wherein a witness admits or does not effectively deny
making the prior inconsistent statement, and the prior consistent state-
ment sought to be introduced is unrelated to any explanation offered.
Wigmore states that when "the self-contradiction is conceded, it re-
mains as a damaging fact, and is in no sense explained away by the
consistent statement. It is just as discrediting, if it was once uttered,
even though the other story has been consistently told a score of
times. 95 The court in Commonwealth v. Jenkins,96 set the following
92. Id. See generally 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1126.
93. Conrad v. Griffey, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 480, 492 (1850).
94. In practice, discretionary balancing of the corroborative value of the statements,
measured in light of elapsed time and the approaching trial, against trial concerns which
include raising of collateral issues, and misleading ofjurors, would inevitably lead to lack of
uniform application.
95. 4 WiaMoRE, supra note 1, § 1126; accord, McCoRMhcK, supra note 3, § 49; Ellicott
v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412 (1836).
96. 76 Mass. (10 Gray) 485 (1858).
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tone:
It did not relieve the difficulty, or in any degree corroborate the last
story told by the witness, to show that previously he had made simi-
lar statements of the transaction. . . The utmost that could be
claimed for it in this view would be that it rendered the last statement
more probable and worthy of credit, because, although the witness
had made a contradictory statement, he had made another statement
similar to those to which he had testified before the jury. But such a
corroboration is altogether too slight and remote. Indeed, if admit-
ted and followed out to its legitimate results, it might properly lead to
a protracted inquiry to ascertain which of the two statements had
been made most frequently by the witness; and when this was deter-
mined, then it would be necessary to ask the jury to believe the wit-
ness if he had repeated the statement made before them a greater
number of times than the contradictory one which had been proved
to impeach his evidence. It is obvious that such a course of inquiry
would furnish no means by which the credit due to the testimony of a
witness could be satisfactorily ascertained.
97
The rule excludes such unrelated consistent statements whether
they precede or are subsequent to the admitted inconsistent statement.
In either event, the acknowledged self-contradiction still exists; the in-
dependent, corroborative value of the consistent statement is altogether
too slight and remote when considered in light of trial concerns.
Relevancy of the Cross-Examiner's Charge to Admissibility
In order to assess the relevancy of the cross-examiners accusations
to admissibility of prior consistent statements a summary of conclu-
sions to date is appropriate.
When impeachment is by means of establishing partiality, the
cross-examiner intends to raise an implied or express charge of falsifi-
cation of testimony. Accordingly, a consistent statement predating the
alleged partiality is admissible as rebuttal. A consistent statement sub-
sequent to the alleged partiality is inadmissible. With respect to an at-
tack by means of self-contradiction, whether by inconsistent statement
or negative evidence, if the prior consistent statement is, in light of all
the circumstances, related to and supportive of either the witness' de-
nial or explanation, the consistent statement is to be admitted, regard-
less of whether the prior consistent statement occurred before or after
the alleged self-contradiction. If the consistent statement is not re-
97. Id. at 488-89. See also Stewart v. People, 23 Mich. 63, 73 (1871); Williams v. St.
Louis Public Service Co., 245 S.W.2d 659, 666 (Mo. App. 1952); Craig v. Craig, 5 Rawle 91,
97-98 (Pa. 1853).
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lated, it is still admissible if it occurred prior to the denied self-contra-
diction but not admissible if it occurred subsequently. A prior
statement not supportive of a witness' explanation of an admitted self-
contradiction is inadmissible without reference to when it was made.
Thus, whether the cross-examiner's impeaching attack be on the
grounds of partiality, negative evidence, or inconsistent statement, the
only circumstances in which a consistent statement is admissible if al-
leged to have been made prior to the occurrence of the alleged im-
peaching event is where a self-contradiction is admitted and either no
explanation is offered or the preceding consistent statement is unre-
lated or not sufficiently related to the explanation. However, if the im-
peachment by self-contradiction includes an implied or express charge
of contrivance or lack of recollection, such statements may become
admissible.
Faulty Recollection
If the cross-examiner attacks the witness' recollection by inconsis-
tent statement or negative evidence,98 the witness' in-court recollection
may be properly supported by a prior consistent statement that pre-
dates the alleged self-contradiction, if the statement was made shortly
after the event in question.99 Thomas v. Ganezer °° illustrates the
98. An attack upon the recollection of the witness occurs when the cross-examiner in-
quires, for example: "Your prior statement was made closer to the event, wasn't it?" (im-
plied attack), or "Your recollection of the event was fresher at the time of the prior statement
wasn't it?" (a more direct attack). The latter question may be objectionable as argumenta-
tive. See note 39 supra.
99. While the older cases evidence disagreement as to admissibility of prior statements
when recollection has been attacked, recent authority is clearly in accord. See generally
Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 909, 929 (1961); Annot., 140 A.L.R. 21, 48 (1942). Professor McCor-
mick strongly supports admissibility of a prior consistent statement under such circum-
stances: "If the witness's accuracy of memory is challenged, it seems clear common sense
that a consistent statement made shortly after the event and before he had time to forget,
should be received in support." McComicK, supra note 3, § 49, at 105 n.88. The term
shortly as employed by McCormick has a relative rather than absolute meaning as the fol-
lowing dictum from United States v. Keller, 145 F. Supp. 692 (D.N.J. 1956), indicates: "De-
fendant concludes that, in the case at bar, since five months elapsed from the time of the
forgery to [sic] time Ginter gave Johnson a statement, too long a time elapsed to make the
statement admissible .... The occasion the courts have to calculate a time sequence [ie.,
whether or not a prior consistent statement was freshly made] is when the court construes an
impeachment to amount to an imputation of inaccurate memory .... Where the judge
construes a line of questioning to be directed towards impugning the memory of a witness,
then he will allow a consistent statement made when the event was recent and memory fresh
to be received in support." While the concept is relative, a prior consistent statement made
years after the event, on the eve of trial, and just before the alleged inconsistent statement,
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soundness of this position. The plaintiff in Thomas brought an action
against a landlord for injuries that the plaintiffs intestate allegedly sus-
tained in falling down the steps of his landlord's building. At trial, a
defense witness testified that he had seen a plaintiff's intestate fall on
the sidewalk several feet from the steps. The cross-examiner intro-
duced inconsistent statements in which the witness claimed that he did
not see the plaintiffs intestate fall. The inconsistent statements which
the witness acknowledged making occurred just prior to the trial, more
than five years after the alleged accident. The defendant then intro-
duced statements by the witness made shortly after the accident that
were consistent with the testimony that the witness had seen the plain-
tiffs intestate fall.
The trial court admitted the statements and the appellate court af-
firmed the trial court's decision. The court reasoned that the consistent
statements were admissible to support the witness's explanation that at
the time he made the inconsistent statement his memory had not been
refreshed, but that prior to his trial testimony he had refreshed his
memory of the accident. Thus according to the court, a consistent
statement made shortly after the event when the witness' memory was
fresh is admissible to support the witness' explanation that his memory
had been refreshed prior to the trial.' 0' The statement clearly tended to
rebut the implied charge raised by the cross-examiner as to the accu-
racy of the witness' recollection.10 2
would clearly possess insufficient supportive effect upon the attacked recollection of the
witness to be admissible to rebut.
100. 137 Conn. 415, 78 A.2d 539 (1951).
101. Id. at 420-21, 78 A.2d at 542.
102. Not all direct or indirect attacks upon the recollection of an in-court witness may be
buttressed by resort to a consistent statement made relatively near to or at the time of the
event. If the cross-examiner charges, expressly or impliedly, that a witness cannot remember
a fact because the witness cannot remember other facts connected with the occurrence in-
volved, a statement consistent with the trial testimony would not rebut the cross examiner's
charge. For example, suppose that a plaintiff sues a defendant for injuries resulting from an
automobile collision at an intersection. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant entered the
intersection against the red light. The defendant, however, asserts that the light was green.
To support his position, the defendant calls a witness who testifies that he saw the light
facing the defendant, and that he remembers that it was green. Suppose the cross-examiner,
plaintiff's counsel, then attacks the witness' memory of the condition of the light by asking
him about other details concerning the accident. The cross-examiner might ask the witness
about the type of structures at the intersection, road conditions, lighting conditions, or the
time of day that the accident occurred. The witness' reply might indicate a lack of recollec-
tion as to some or all of such facts. A prior consistent statement made shortly after the
accident that the light was green would neither refute nor explain why the witness forgot so
many other facts about the accident scene. Given this situation, a statement consistent with
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Contrivance
The cross-examiner who impeaches by inconsistent statement or
negative evidence may accompany the attack with a charge that the
witness decided at some time after the event, often for an unspecified
reason, to falsify his trial testimony. If such a charge is levied, a state-
ment predating the alleged self-contradiction would rebut because it
"tends strongly to disprove that the testimony was the result of contri-
vance."10 3 A direct charge of contrivance accompanying impeachment
by means of prior inconsistent statement or negative evidence is illus-
trated by the questions "When did you first decide to change your testi-
mony for trial?" or "Why did you change your story?" A question
which implies rather than directly asserts contrivance would be, for ex-
ample, "Didn't you talk with plaintiffs counsel shortly before testifying
here today?" 1  4
Whenever an attack by self-contradiction is capable of interpreta-
tion as a charge that the witness' trial testimony was the result of contri-
vance, a consistent statement predating the alleged self-contradiction
should be admissible to rebut the attack. Moreover, the consistent
statement is sufficiently rebutting without reference to the witness' re-
sponse to the impeachment by self-contradiction itself.105
the testimony would not in any significant respect rebut the cross-examiner's charge of lack
of recollection. Only where the cross-examiner engages in a direct attack upon the witness's
ability to recall the particular fact in question, and employs an inconsistent statement or
impeaches the witness by negative evidence addressed to that very fact, should a prior con-
sistent statement near the event be admitted to rebut.
103. McCoRMIcK, supra note 3, § 49, at 106.
104. It is also possible to charge impliedly a contrivance by reference to a particular
circumstance in which the witness failed to speak when it would have been natural to do so.
For example, it may be implied that the first time the witness spoke consistently with his
trial testimony was close to the time of trial, thereby raising the inference that for a long
period of time the witness failed so to speak. In Commonwealth v. Wilson, 67 Mass. 337
(1854), a witness for the Commonwealth testified to certain facts tending to show that the
homicide was premeditated. On cross-examination, the defendant was asked when any one
first questioned him concerning the facts to which he had testified in chief, to whiclf he
answered, "about six weeks before." On redirect examination the witness was correctly per-
mitted to state that he had communicated the same facts to other persons at or about the
time of the homicide. The consistent statement early in time rebutted the inference sug-
gested by the questions aimed at the time of first speaking, that the witness' trial testimony
was thereafter contrived.
105. Because the consistent statement rebuts the added charge of contrivance, the wit-
ness' response to the attempted impeachment is no longer controlling.
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Ascertaining the Cross-Examiner's Charge
When the cross-examiner attacks the credibility of the witness with
an alleged self-contradiction but without also charging partiality, the
cross-examiner may intend to charge either that: (1) the witness' recol-
lection at trial is impaired, (2) the witness fabricated his trial statement
for some unknown reason, or for only an indirectly alluded to reason at,
some time, after uttering the inconsistent statement, or (3) merely that
the witness' testimony at trial is not to be believed because the unex-
plained inconsistency indicates that it is unreliable testimony (i.e. the
witness is confused or mistaken). An attack upon recollection or an
assertion that the testimony is a contrivance may be communicated by
the cross-examiner at the time of examination. The charge that the
trial testimony is unreliable, however, can only be made during sum-
mation because it is argument. Of course, both lack of recollection and
contrivance, as argument, could also be raised properly for the first
time upon summation. Alternatively, as sometimes occurs, counsel
could simply fail to indicate the intended inference during both cross-
examination and summation, leaving the jury free to draw either one or
more of the three inferences completely on their own.
An obvious difficulty is raised when the inference the cross-exam-
iner intends the trier of fact to draw may not be evident until closing
argument. A charge of either lack of recollection or contrivance would,
independent of other possibilities, trigger the admissibility of consistent
statements predating the alleged self-contradiction. The charge that
the witness is simply not to be believed would not allow the consistent
statements to be introduced. The dilemma is of real concern. When
the charges are first made during summation, it is obviously too late for
a prior consistent statement, not otherwise admissible, to be offered in
rebuttal.
Recognizing this dilemma, McCormick offers the following
solution:
[I]f in the particular situation, the attack by inconsistent statement is
accompanied by, or interpretable as, a charge of a plan or contri-
vance to give false testimony, then proof of a prior consistent state-
ment before the plan or contrivance was formed, tends strongly to
disprove that the testimony was the result of contrivance .... It is
for the judge to decide whether the impeachment amounts to a
charge of contrivance,-ordinarily this is the most obvious implica-
tion-and it seems he is entitled to have an avowal one way or an-
other from counsel. If it does not, then it may often amount to an
imputation of inaccurate memory. If so, the consistent statement




Thus, where not obviously "interpretable" by the court from the cross-
examination itself, McCormick suggests that the cross-examining coun-
sel be required, presumably after completing cross-examination and
prior to redirect, to state to the court what argument he intends to
make. He should have to state whether he intends to argue either con-
trivance, lack of recollection (in which case a predating prior consistent
statement will be admissible), or simply that the contradiction shows
that the witness is unworthy of belief (in either case a predating prior
consistent statement would not be 'admissible by virtue of the cross-
examiner's charge). Presumably, although McCormick does not specif-
ically provide for the possibility, if cross-examining counsel states that
he intends merely to refer to the inconsistency in closing without di-
recting the jury toward a specific inference, or if he states that he will
not refer to the inconsistency at all, the prior statement would not be
admissible.
McCormick's suggestion does not appear to have had much im-
pact upon the courts. One reason for this indifference might be that
such a system would result in counsel's advising that he intends to ar-
gue neither lack of recollection nor contrivance, or that he has not de-
cided yet, as may very well be the case, what tack to take regarding
credibility of the witness. Knowledge of the effect of charging either
lack of recollection or contrivance might cause observant counsel to
refrain from presenting on cross-examination any charge "interpreta-
ble" by the court as either, which when coupled with a denial of intent
to argue would keep a prior consistent statement not otherwise admissi-
ble from being admitted into evidence.10 7
The Problems with the California Resolution
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that any analysis of
the admissibility of prior consistent statements to rebut a charge of self-
106. McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 49. The passage continues: "Recognition of these
exceptions would leave it still open to these courts to exclude most statements procured after
the inconsistent statement, and thus to discourage pressure on witnesses to furnish successive
counter-statements."
107. A court may also find it somewhat unusual to inquire of counsel of his proposed
plan of attack as to the credibility of a witness during closing argument. Such an inquiry
would give the proponent of the witness the opportunity on redirect, and possibly through
his questioning of other witnesses, to shore up against the attack. An inquiry as to projected
closing argument is clearly extraordinary, possessing more complex implications than may
be initially apparent.
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contradiction is necessarily multifaceted. It should also be obvious that
the complexity of the approach thus formulated may create difficulties
with respect to accurate and uniform application by the court during
the heat of trial. In addition, upon review of the multifaceted ap-
proach, it appears that the only predating consistent statements not ad-
missible are those statements that are insufficiently related to an
admitted self-contradiction when lack of recollection or contrivance is
not expressly or impliedly charged.
The benefits of developing an approach capable of accurate and
uniform application at trial are great. If one assumes: (1) a charge of
contrivance is the "most obvious implication";10 (2) relatively few in-
stances occur where such a consistent statement would be otherwise
inadmissible and thus both the risk of potential prejudice and the fear
of development of significant trial concerns are reduced; and (3) the
suggested approach would not itself result in the presence of complicat-
ing factors affecting accurate uniform application, one could argue
strongly in favor of permitting admissibility of all predating consistent
statements to buttress a witness against a charge of self-contradiction.
California, in section 79 1(a) of the Evidence Code, adopted just such
an approach:
Evidence of a statement previously made by a witness that is consis-
tent with his testimony at the hearing is inadmissible to support his
credibility unless it is offered after: (a) Evidence of a statement'made
by him that is inconsistent with any part of his testimony at the hear-
ing has been admitted for the purpose of attacking his credibility,
and the statement was made before the alleged inconsistent state-
ment .... 109
Unfortunately each of the three predicates stated is subject to seri-
ous dispute.110 The Comment of the Law Revision Committee' to
section 791(a) states that the section is based on the premise that im-
peachment by self-contradiction is "necessarily an implied charge that
the witness has fabricated his testimony since the time" of the self-con-
tradiction.112 Under common law, however, when a witness was im-
peached by self-contradiction, the inference raised was thought to be
108. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
109. CAL. EVID. CODE § 791(a) (West 1966).
110. See Comment, Rehabilitation of the Impeached Witness Through Prior Consistent
StatementsAn Anaolsis and Critique of California Evidence Code Section 791, 50 S. CAL. L.
REv. 109, 146 n.137 (1976).
111. CAL. EVID. CODE § 791(a) (West 1966).
112. While § 791(a) speaks only to inconsistent statements, its rationale applies as well if
not with greater force to impeachment by negative evidence.
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solely one of inconsistency, that is, a witness who has spoken both ways
upon a question is unworthy of belief.113 No further assumption in law
was made from the fact of such impeachment alone, nor was it assumed
that the jury would on its own reach the position that the witness in-
court testimony was a contrivance. Since it is also likely that the wit-
ness had decided to fabricate his trial testimony long before he made
the inconsistent statement, no inference of recent falsification was
thought to follow necessarily. Thus, only if an express or implied
charge of contrivance accompanied the attack by self-contradiction did
a predating consistent statement become admissible to rebut. 1 4
The second assumption fares no better. In modem litigation prac-
tice the taking of formal written or recorded statements is a common
event. Resort to discovery, especially interrogatories and depositions,
is rampant in civil matters; use of the grand jury and preliminary hear-
ing preserves testimony in criminal proceedings. As a result of the vol-
ume of such statements, it is a common occurrence for a witness to
acknowledge at trial the making of an inconsistent statement. In many
instances, the inconsistency asserted is minimal at best and often ad-
dressed to a fact not itself critical to the litigation. 1 5 Frequently no
explanation is elicited by counsel from the witness with respect to such
inconsistencies; no predating consistent statement is offered to corrobo-
rate. When a truly inconsistent statement focuses upon a matter of im-
portance to the litigation, however, an explanation will generally be
forthcoming. 116
113. See, e.g., authorities cited notes 95-96 supra.
114. This point, raised by the dissent in Bickford v. Mauser, 53 Cal. App. 2d 680, 689-91,
128 P.2d 79, 84-85 (1942), was discussed in People v. Bias, 170 Cal. App. 2d 502, 511, 339
P.2d 204, 210 (1959), the case cited by the Law Revision Commission in support of the
assertion of a necessarily implied charge. Interestingly, admissibility of the prior statement
in Bias is best supported on the grounds that it related to a witness' explanation of an admit-
ted inconsistent statement. See notes 65-75 & accompanying text Supra.
115. For example, it is not uncommon for a witness at trial who testifies to being about
85 feet from the intersection at the time of the accident to be impeached with a prior state-
ment that he was somewhere between 80 and 100 feet away.
116. Such explanation could include statements such as "I was confused," "I didn't
understand the question," "He didn't let me finish," "I told him but he didn't write it
down," or "I signed it but I didn't read it!' Professor Maguire describes the process of
explanation as follows: "[Nothing] forbid[s] an effort to rehabilitate the witness by proving
that the asserted inconsistent statement has been misquoted or misinterpreted in court and
was not really inconsistent at all; or that the inconsistency was uttered under circumstances
of nervous strain, weariness, or misunderstanding which prevented the speaker from appre-
ciating or accurately conveying the truth." MAGUIfE, EVmENcE-CoMMoN SENSE AND
COMMON LAW 62 (1947).
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In considering the advisability of permitting all predating consis-
tent statements to be admitted where the witness acknowledges the self-
contradiction, it is important to realize that by the very nature of things
an earlier statement will most often not be related to the inconsistent
statement. Because of the frequency with which a witness today must
acknowledge the existence of the self-contradiction, the potential for
introduction of predating consistent statements, both actually made
and falsified, is considerable if such statements are allowed into
evidence.
Trial concerns associated with the introduction of such consistent
statements should not be discounted lightly." 17 If the predating consis-
tent statement is introduced, opposing counsel must be afforded the
opportunity to combat by cross-examination the inference raised.
Under certain circumstances, this will entail calling witnesses to refute
the statement's existence. In addition, the proponent of the witness
may call someone else to counter the refutation. Presentation of this
testimony entails further cross-examination. The situation must be
considered in light of the fact that such a predating statement possesses
only slight corroborative value, a fact often not readily apparent to the
jury. The likely result of admitting the predating consistent statement
would be to mislead the jury, confuse the issues, waste time, and pose a
danger of unfair prejudice.
Finally, the simplified approach of section 791(a) does not with-
stand analysis where the impeachment by self-contradiction, admitted
by the witness, is accompanied by a charge of partiality. 18 Under sec-
Sometimes the matter is not pursued on redirect out of fear that an attempted explana-
tion of the inconsistency, whether critical or not, will do more harm than good.
117. Maguire states the proposition as follows: "[E]ntirely aside from any technical ar-
gument-matching about hearsay or non-hearsay, the court fears a laxer regime might foment
unsavory practices in dealing with witnesses, practices increasing false testimony, impeding
discovery of the truth, making the lot of the witness harried and uncomfortable, and lower-
ing popular respect for the courts. Scarcely less important, disputes caused by this kind of
thimble-rigging would waste an enormous amount of trial time on confusing trivialities."
Id. at 63. See notes 19-22, 107 supra and 125 infra.
118. Additional difficulties arise if a witness is impeached with more than one self-con-
tradiction. A prior consistent statement would clearly be admitted on the theory underlying
§ 791(a) if it preceded the earliest alleged self-contradiction; it should not automatically be
admissible if it predates only the latest self-contradiction. In certain situations, however,
such as where the witness denies having made at least the earliest prior inconsistent state-
ment, a consistent statement predating the later self-contradiction but not the first would
also seem admissible on the same theory. The difficulty with this analysis is that a rule
designed to be simple has become once again extremely complex. This may account for the
fact that, pursuant to the language of 79 1(a), a prior consistent statement may be admissible
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tion 791(b) a prior consistent statement made before the partiality is
alleged to have arisen is admissible to rebut the charge.119 If the prior
consistent statement precedes the alleged self-contradiction, it is admis-
sible under section 791(a); if it precedes the alleged partiality, it is ad-
missible pursuant to section 791(b).
Notice what occurs if the alleged self-contradiction is accompa-
nied by evidence of partiality alleged to have arisen prior to the making
of a consistent statement made prior to the self-contradiction, a situa-
tion present in People v. Manson.120 In the trial of Charles Manson,
Juan Flynn testified for the prosecution that Manson had confessed to
the killings charged. On cross-examination it developed that prior to
testifying, Flynn had spoken to the Los Angeles Police Department on
August 16, 1970, and that the resulting sixteen pages of testimony con-
tained no reference to the confessions of Manson. In rehabilitation of
Flynn, the prosecutor called a California highway patrolman, who tes-
tified that he had recorded an interview with Flynn nine months prior
to Flynn's conversation with the Los Angeles Police Department. Over
strenuous objection the portion of a tape recording of the conversation
containing a statement by Flynn consistent with his court testimony
was then played for the jury.
Citing section 791(b),' 2' the defense argued that the prior consis-
to rebut the implied inference of contrivance as to any self-contradiction which it predates,
without reference to the presence of any other sef-contradiction.
Of course, a charge of partiality could accompany impeachment by self-contradiction
accompanied by a charge of lack of recollection or contrivance. See, e.g., United States v.
Lombardi, 550 F.2d 827, 828-29 (1977). (Prior statement was inadmissible if an answer to
an accusation of self-contradiction coupled with a charge of contrivance. The statement was
admissible, however, to rebut the alleged partiality).
119. Evidence of a statement previously made by a witness that is consistent with his
testimony at the hearing is inadmissible to support his credibility unless it is offered after
... (b) An express or implied charge has been made that his testimony at the hearing is
recently fabricated or is influenced by bias or other improper motive, and the statement was
made before the bias, motive for fabrication, or other improper motive is alleged to have
arisen." CAL. EviD. CODE § 791(b) (West 1966).
The Comment to § 791(b) states: "This subdivision codifies existing law. See People v.
Kynette, 15 Cal.2d 731, 104 P.2d 794 (1940) (overruled on other grounds in People v. Sny-
der, 50 Cal.2d 190, 197, 324 P.2d 1, 6 (1958)). Of course, if the consistent statement was
made after the time the improper motive is alleged to have arisen, the logical thrust of the
evidence is lost and the statement is inadmissible. See People v. Doetschman, 69 Cal. App.
2d 486, 159 P.2d 418 (1945)." Id. & 791 Comment.
120. 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 986 (1977).
121. 61 Cal. App. 3d at 143-44, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 288: "The predicate for Manson's
assertion turns on collateral facts. On August 16, 1969, Spahn ranch was raided by the Los
Angeles County Sheriffs Office in connection with suspected criminal activity involving the
theft of dune buggies. The raid resulted in a number of people, including Flynn, being
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tent statement was inadmissible because the witness was shown to have
a bias or motive to fabricate at the time he made the prior consistent
statement. The court rejected this argument. It concluded that the
prior statement was admissible pursuant to section 791(a), 122 even
though it failed to meet the requirements of section 791(b):
Appellant's argument fails because it ignores the fact that Evidence
Code section 791 has two parts. Subdivision (a) permits evidence of
a prior consistent statement to rehabilitate a witness impeached by a
statement contrary to his trial testimony while subdivision (b) allows
the prior consistent statement to rehabilitate after an express charge
or implication of recent fabrication or of bias. Whether or not subdi-
vision (b) of Evidence Code section 791 is applicable is of no conse-
quence to the application of subdivision (a) of that section. Even if it
is assumed the Steuber tape postdated the inception of any bias or
motive to fabricate on the part of Flynn, that fact would only bear on
its introduction within the circumstances described in subdivision (b)
of section 791. It certainly would not preclude application of subdi-
vision (a) of section 791 and the introduction of the Steuber tape
predating the August 16, 1970 interview. The statement was properly
arrested. On cross-examination Flynn was asked whether or not he was mad at Manson
because of this incident. Flynn answered that he believed Manson and the Family were
responsible for the raid but that he did not blame Manson. Additionally, Flynn testified
that he worked off and on as an actor. On cross-examination Flynn was asked if he was
testifying in order to obtain fame, the clear insinuation being that Flynn was cooperating as
a prosecution witness in order to advance his own theatrical ambitions. Flynn denied that
suggestion. Manson's argument turns more on the insinuation of the questions than on any
of Flynn's testimony. The questions, and not Flynn's answers, suggest that Flynn developed
a bias as a result of his being arrested on August 16, 1969."
122. 61 Cal. App. 3d at 143, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 287: "There is no disagreement that
Flynn's failure to reveal this critical admission when interviewed by the Los Angeles Police
Department raised the specter of recent fabrication. It is elementary that recent frabrication
may be inferred when it is shown that a witness did not speak about an important matter at
a time when it would have been natural for him to do so. When that inference does arise, it
is generally proper to permit rehabilitation by a prior consistent statement. Different con-
siderations come into play when a charge of recent fabrication is made by negative evidence
that tke witness did not speak of the matter before when it would have been natural to
speak. His silence then is urged as inconsistent with his utterances at the trial. The evidence
of consistent statements at that point becomes proper because 'the supposed fact of not
speaking formerly, from which we are to infer a recent contrivance of the story, is disposed
of by denying it to be a fact, inasmuch as the witness did speak and tell the same story."'
(People v. Gentry, 270 Cal. App. 2d 462, 473-76; Cal. Rptr. 336, 343-44 (1969)."
The court in Gentry is quoting 4 WIOMORE, supra note 1, § 1129 relating to impeach-
ment by negative evidence. Thus, the Manson court, in discussing the admissibility of an
earlier consistent statement to rebut an inference of recent contrivance raised by negative
evidence which was neither denied or explained, cited a discussion in Gentry, a case involv-
ing a prior consistent statement that supported a witness' explanation. Moreover, Manson





Manson illustrates the danger which results from the California
approach. While a prior consistent statement should generally be ad-
mitted if it rebuts one attack upon the credibility of a witness without
reference to whether it rebuts another attack, the prior consistent state-
ment must in fact rebut the attack against which it is offered. The par-
ties in Manson stipulated to the existence of the prior inconsistent
statement of Flynn; apparently no explanation of the omission was of-
fered. No express or implied charge of contrivance was levied. 124 The
attack of the cross-examiner was clearly one of falsification by reason
of partiality, not contrivance for some unexplained reason or lack of
recollection. The prior consistent statement thus did not rebut the at-
tack made' 25 nor did it corroborate in any other manner the testimony
of Flynn.
Most importantly, when a charge of partiality is levied, the risk of
the jury's becoming confused and being misled by the introduction of
the prior consistent statement under the rubric of rebutting an attack by
self-contradiction is greatly increased. Unless it is specifically in-
structed, the jury is likely to consider the prior consistent statement as
being relevant to rebut the charge of partiality. 26 Even if properly in-
123. 61 Cal. App. 3d at 144, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
124. The cross-examiner under these circumstances would probably argue if pressed
that as a result of partiality the witness intended, prior to making the inconsistent statement,
to testify as actually done at trial, but for some reason, such as simply the basic need to tell
someone what really happened, the witness spoke inconsistently.
125. People v. Gentry, 270 Cal. App. 2d 462, 473, 76 Cal. Rptr. 336, 343 (1969), states
that where partiality is charged, the prior statement must predate the time when the partial-
ity allegedly arose: "Prior statements consistent with testimony are, as an exception to the
hearsay rule, admitted for the purpose of rehabilitation following an attempt to impeach the
testimony. If, however, the consistent statement was made after an improper motive is al-
leged to have arisen, the statement is inadmissible .... The Evidence Code codifies this
rule .... The reasons for this limitation is that when there is a contradiction between the
testimony of two witnesses it cannot help the trier of fact in deciding between them merely to
show that one of the witnesses has asserted the same thing previously. 'If that were an
argument, then the witness who had repeated his story to the greatest number of people
would be the most credible.' (4 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.) § 1127, p. 202.)"
126. A limiting instruction may be given pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 105.
One solution to this problem is to require that when partiality is charged in connection
with impeachment by self-contradiction, any prior consistent statement must predate both
the self-contradiction and the alleged arising of the partiality. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 791
Comment (West 1966). The difficulty with this approach is that it adds complexity to a
system designed to be simple and that it prohibits introduction of consistent statements
which explain, deny or rebut a charge of contrivance or lack of recollection, but do not
predate the alleged partiality. Incorporating each of these possibilities into the solution
brings one to exactly the same position arrived at by rejecting the California approach.
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structed, the average jury's ability to comprehend and apply the in-
struction is questionable. If impeachment charging partiality is
accepted by the trier of fact, the impeachment will be extremely critical
in assessing credibility. Thus, introduction of the prior consistent state-
ment in cases such as Manson could give rise to substantial unfair
prejudice. This risk of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and
misleading the jury associated with introduction of the consistent state-
ment should certainly not be entertained when the prior consistent
statement neither denies, explains, nor rebuts the attack based on self-
contradiction.
In summary, while arguments in support of the California ap-
proach, such as ease of understanding and uniform application, are ex-
ceptionally appealing, analysis of the predicates underlying section 791
discloses significant difficulties. California Evidence Code section 791
permits the introduction of many consistent statements not themselves
sufficiently corroborative to be admitted. It also creates significant
risks of confusion of the issues and misleading of the jury. Finally,
where partiality is also alleged, the approach may lead to prejudice un-
less it is modified. Modification would detract from the ease of under-
standing and uniform application sought to be achieved. Although
there are certain advantages in simply permitting admission of all ear-
lier consistent statements, including predating statements to rebut an
admitted self-contradiction used in naked impeachment, the disadvan-
tages associated with the admission of prior consistent statements not
otherwise admissible overshadow these advantages.
Proposal
A proposed amendment to Rule 80 l(d)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence should be amended to read as follows:
(d) Statements that are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if-
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement and the statement is ... (B) consistent with his testimony
and the statement (i) rebuts an express or implied charge against him
of partiality, (ii) supports an explanation or denial of a charge
against him of self-contradiction, or (iii) rebuts an express or implied
charge against him of lack of recollection or contrivance accompany-
ing a charge of self-contradiction.
The proposal incorporates the terminology and analysis employed
throughout this Article. The term "improper influence or motive" ap-
pearing in current Rule 801(d)(1)(B) being evidence of contrivance and
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therefore grounds for impeachment has been deleted in subdivision (i)
in favor of "partiality." 127 Similarly, in subdivision (ii) the term "re-
cent fabrication" has been removed in favor of "self-contradiction"
which is introduced to cover impeachment by inconsistent statement as
well as impeachment by negative evidence.128 The four touchstones
129
relating to witness response to a charge of self-contradiction are ex-
pressed in terms of support of an explanation or denial by the witness.
Pursuant to these touchstones, consistent statements that predate a de-
nial or that predate and are related to an explanation are admissible;
those unrelated or insufficiently related to an explanation, if any, re-
garding an admitted self-contradiction are inadmissible.130 Subsequent
consistent statements are also admissible if they are related to the wit-
ness explanation or denial.131 Consistent statements predating a
charged self-contradiction are not admissible pursuant to subdivision
(ii). Subdivision (iii) provides for admissibility of the statement if the
cross-examiner makes a direct or implied charge of lack of recollection
or contrivance.1 32 Of course, any prior consistent statement admissible
pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) would be admitted as substantive
evidence.
1 33
The proposed rule incorporates the requirement contained in Rule
801(d)(1)(B) that a prior consistent statement be admitted only if the
declarant "testifies at trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examina-
tion concerning the [consistent] statement." The term "subject to cross-
examination" does not require the actual occurrence of cross-examina-
127. See text accompanying notes 31-35 supra.
128. See text accompanying notes 25-98 supra.
129. See text accompanying notes 64-98 supra.
130. Id.
131. See text accompanying notes 72-75, 84-92 supra.
132. See text accompanying notes 99-106 supra. Charged lack of recollection or con-
tiuance not accompanied by a charge of self-contradiction are excluded on the basis of an
assessment of probative value of such corroboration versus trial concerns. If a prior consis-
tent statement is admissible because it meets the requirements of one but not another provi-
sion of the proposed rule, a limiting instruction may be in order. See FED. R. Evm. 105.
The proposed rule thus uses the terms "explain and deny" consistently with their use in rule
613. See note 78 supra; Graham, supra note 23.
133. "Prior consistent statements traditionally have been admissible to rebut charges of
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive but not as substantive evidence. Under
the rule they are substantive evidence. The prior statement is consistent with the testimony
given on the stand, and, if the opposite party wishes to open the door for its admission in
evidence, no sound reason is apparent why it should not be received generally." Advisory
Committee Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 296 (1973).
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tion but only its availability. 134 Thus if partiality of a witness is
charged, the proponent of the witness may call another person to testify
to the existence of an admissible consistent statement of the witness.135
So long as the declarant is available for recall and cross-examination
concerning the consistent statement, the "subject to" requirement of
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is satisifed.
While Rule 801(d)(1)(B) permits introduction of the consistent
statement initially through testimony other than that of the declarant,
introduction of the consistent statement initially through the testimony
of the declarant best serves the interests of justice. Impeachment by
partiality of self-contradiction will be most frequent during cross-ex-
amination of the witness. 136 If upon redirect the declarant offers the
prior consistent statement, conditions of admissibility can be examined
while the impeachment is fresh in everyone's mind. The trier of fact
will be assisted in evaluating both the impeachment and the attempted
buttressing of the witness by having the impeaching and countering tes-
timony presented in juxtaposition. If the cross-examiner's attack on the
credibility of the witness is crucial in the context of the litigation, the
court should permit the proponent of the witness also to introduce evi-
dence from other sources as to the existence of the consistent state-
ment.137 However, where a particular impeaching attack is relatively
134. This conclusion is based in part upon the relationship of Rule 801(d)(l)(A) and
Rule 613. See generally Graham, supra note 23.
135. Pursuant to the common law, there was some early indication that the declarant
himself could not testify to the consistent statement; such testimony had to come from an-
other witness. More modem authority generally permits the declarant to testify also. See
People v. Mirendo, 23 N.Y. 2d 439, 245 N.E.2d 194 (1969); 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, §
1132; Anno., 75 A.L.R.2d 901, 958-59 (1961); Annot., 140 A.L.R. 21, 167-78 (1942).
136. See Graham, supra note 23, for discussion of permissibility of different procedures
for charging self-contradiction under rule 613.
137. See, e.g., United States v. Zito, 467 F.2d 1401 (2d Cir. 1972), where the witness,
Doran, testified for the government that the defendants, the Zitos, had made loans to him at
usurious interest rates and had used extortionate practices in their attempts to collect the
loans. After receiving the loans, Doran had participated in several crimes in an attempt to
raise money to pay off his debts. On cross-examination of Doran, the defense charged that
Doran had not been indicted for several of the crimes he committed and that Doran had
falsified his testimony against the defendants to escape punishment for the crimes. The
court then allowed six witnesses to testify to having heard statements made by Doran which
were consistent with his direct testimony concerning the nature of the loans and the Zitos'
threats of what would happen to him if he failed to make the payments.
In United States v. lancotti, 406 F. Supp. 554 (E.D.N.Y.), af/'d on other grounds, 540
F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976), a government witness testified that the defendant had requested a
bribe. In response to the witness' testimony, the defendant later testified that instead of
requesting a bribe from the government witness, the witness in fact had offered him a bribe
that he did not solicit. On rebuttal, the government then called the witness' business partner
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unimportant in the context of the litigation, trial concerns may prompt
the court to limit corroboration to the declarant's own testimony.
Requiring that the prior consistent statement be initially devel-
oped through the testimony of the witness also serves the witness' con-
venience. If the prior consistent statement is not initially brought out
on redirect examination, but rather through testimony of another wit-
ness, the declarant must remain available for cross-examination later in
the trial concerning the statement. Thus for each of the reasons set
forth in Rule 611(a): "(1) make the interrogation and presentation ef-
fective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consump-
tion of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue
embarrassment," 138 a consistent statement should normally be brought
out first upon redirect examination of the witness.
Conclusion
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) has done little if anything to clear up the confu-
sion associated with the introduction of prior consistent statements in
support of the credibility of an impeached witness. Analysis of the con-
ceptual framework underlying the common-law rules leads to the con-
clusion that amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is in order. Confused
terminology such as "recent fabrication" should be discarded. On the
other hand, concepts such as lack of recollection and contrivance
should be explicitly recognized. Although a broad rule allowing ad-
missibility of predating consistent statements to rebut self-contradiction
has certain salutary features, trial concerns and the risk of unfair
prejudice require formulation of a theoretically justifiable rule. Al-
though the problems associated with introduction of prior consistent
statements remain relatively complicated, incorporation of an analyti-
cal approach into Rule 801(d)(1)(B) will do much to clear up the confu-
sion now present.
and his attorney. To rebut the government's implied charge that the witness had an im-
proper motive to conceal his attempted bribe, the two rebuttal witnesses testified to state-
ments that the earlier witness had made on the day of the bribe that were consistent with the
witness' testimony. Judge Weinstein concluded that because the declarant had testified at
the trial concerning his encounter with the defendant, the prior consistent statements intro-
duced through the two rebuttal witnesses were substantively admissible pursuant to Rule
801(d)(1)(B).
138. FED. IL EvID. 611(a). See note 106 supra.
January 1979]

